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ABSTRACT
We study network centrality based on dynamic influence
propagation models in social networks. To illustrate our in-
tegrated mathematical-algorithmic approach for understand-
ing the fundamental interplay between dynamic influence
processes and static network structures, we focus on two
basic centrality measures: (a) Single Node Influence (SNI)
centrality, which measures each node’s significance by its
influence spread;1 and (b) Shapley Centrality, which uses
the Shapley value of the influence spread function — formu-
lated based on a fundamental cooperative-game-theoretical
concept — to measure the significance of nodes. We present
a comprehensive comparative study of these two centrality
measures. Mathematically, we present axiomatic character-
izations, which precisely capture the essence of these two
centrality measures and their fundamental differences. Al-
gorithmically, we provide scalable algorithms for approxi-
mating them for a large family of social-influence instances.
Empirically, we demonstrate their similarity and differences
in a number of real-world social networks, as well as the effi-
ciency of our scalable algorithms. Our results shed light on
their applicability: SNI centrality is suitable for assessing
individual influence in isolation while Shapley centrality as-
sesses individuals’ performance in group influence settings.
Keywords
Social network; social influence; influence diffusion model;
interplay between network and influence model; network
centrality; Shapley values; scalable algorithms
1. INTRODUCTION
Network science is a fast growing discipline that uses
mathematical graph structures to represent real-world net-
works — such as the Web, Internet, social networks, bio-
logical networks, and power grids — in order to study fun-
damental network properties. However, network phenom-
ena are far more complex than what can be captured only
by nodes and edges, making it essential to formulate net-
work concepts by incorporating network facets beyond graph
structures [36]. For example, network centrality is a key
concept in network analysis. The centrality of nodes, usu-
ally measured by a real-valued function, reflects their signif-
icance, importance, or crucialness within the given network.
Numerous centrality measures have been proposed, based on
1The influence spread of a group is the expected number of
nodes this group can activate as the initial active set.
degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector (i.e., PageR-
ank) (cf. [23]). However, most of these centrality measures
focus only on the static topological structures of the net-
works, while real-world network data include much richer
interaction dynamics beyond static topology.
Influence propagation is a wonderful example of interac-
tion dynamics in social networks. As envisioned by Domin-
gos and Richardson [28, 14], and beautifully formulated by
Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos [18], social influence propa-
gation can be viewed as a stochastic dynamic process over
an underlying static graph: After a group of nodes becomes
active, these seed nodes propagate their influence through
the graph structure. Even when the static graph structure
of a social network is fixed, dynamic phenomena such as
the spread of ideas, epidemics, and technological innova-
tions can follow different processes. Thus, network central-
ity, which aims to measure nodes’ importance in social in-
fluence, should be based not only on static graph structure,
but also on the dynamic influence propagation process.
In this paper, we address the basic question of how to
formulate network centrality measures that reflect dynamic
influence propagation. We will focus on the study of the
interplay between social influence and network centrality.
A social influence instance specifies a directed graph G =
(V,E) and an influence model PI (see Section 2). For each
S ⊆ V , PI defines a stochastic influence process on G with S
as the initial active set, which activates a random set I(S) ⊇
S with probability PI(S, I(S)). Then, σ(S) = E[|I(S)|]
is the influence spread of S. The question above can be
restated as: Given a social-influence instance (V,E, PI), how
should we define the centrality of nodes in V ?
A natural centrality measure for each node v ∈ V is its
influence spread σ({v}). However, this measure — referred
to as the single node influence (SNI) centrality — completely
ignores the influence profile of groups of nodes and a node’s
role in such group influence. Thus, other more sensible cen-
trality measures accounting for group influence may better
capture nodes’ roles in social influence. As a concrete formu-
lation of group-influence analyses, we apply Shapley value
[31] — a fundamental concept from cooperative game theory
— to define a new centrality measure for social influence.
Cooperative game theory is a mathematical theory study-
ing people’s performance and behavior in coalitions (cf.
[21]). Mathematically, an n-person coalitional game is de-
fined by a characteristic function τ : 2V → R, where V = [n],
and τ(S) is the utility of the coalition S [31]. In this
game, the Shapley value φShapleyv (τ) of v ∈ V is v’s expected
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marginal contribution in a random order. More precisely:
φShapleyv (τ) = Epi[τ(Spi,v ∪ {v})− τ(Spi,v)], (1)
where Spi,v denotes the set of players preceding v in a ran-
dom permutation pi of V : The Shapley value enjoys an ax-
iomatic characterization (see Section 2), and is widely con-
sidered to be the fairest measure of a player’s power in a
cooperative game.
Utilizing the above framework, we view influence spread
σ(·) as a characteristic function, and define the Shapley cen-
trality of an influence instance as the Shapley value of σ.
In this paper, we present a comprehensive comparative
study of SNI and Shapley centralities. In the age of Big
Data, networks are massive. Thus, an effective solution
concept in network science should be both mathematically
meaningful and algorithmically efficient. In our study, we
will address both the conceptual and algorithmic questions.
Conceptually, influence-based centrality can be viewed as
a dimensional reduction from the high dimensional influence
model PI to a low dimensional centrality measure. Dimen-
sional reduction of data is a challenging task, because in-
evitably some information is lost. As highlighted by Ar-
row’s celebrated impossibility theorem on voting [3], for var-
ious (desirable) properties, conforming dimensional reduc-
tion scheme may not even exist. Thus, it is fundamental to
characterize what each centrality measure captures.
So, “what do Shapley and SNI centralities capture? what
are their basic differences?” Axiomatization is an instru-
mental approach for such characterization. In Section 3, we
present our axiomatic characterizations. We present five ax-
ioms for Shapley centrality, and prove that it is the unique
centrality measure satisfying these axioms. We do the same
for the SNI centrality with three axioms. Using our ax-
iomatic characterizations, we then provide a detailed com-
parison of Shapley and SNI centralities. Our characteriza-
tions show that (a) SNI centrality focuses on individual in-
fluence and would not be appropriate for models concerning
group influence, such as threshold-based models. (b) Shap-
ley centrality focuses on individuals’ “irreplaceable power”
in group influence settings, but may not be interpreted well
if one prefer to focus on individual influence in isolation.
The computation of influence-based centralities is also a
challenging problem: Exact computation of influence spread
in the basic independent cascade and linear-threshold models
has been shown to be #P-complete [37, 12]. Shapley cen-
trality computation seems to be more challenging since its
definition as in Eq. (1) involves n! permutations, and existing
Shapley value computation in several simple network games
have quadratic or cubic time complexity [19]. Facing these
challenges, in Section 4, we present provably-good scalable
algorithms for approximating both Shapley and SNI central-
ities of a large family of social influence instances. Surpris-
ingly, both algorithms share the same algorithm structure,
which extends techniques from the recent algorithmic break-
throughs in influence maximization [10, 34, 33]. We further
conduct empirical evaluation of Shapley and SNI centrali-
ties in a number of real-world networks. Our experiments
— see Section 5 — show that our algorithms can scale up
to networks with tens of millions of nodes and edges, and
these two centralities are similar in several cases but also
have noticeable differences.
These combined mathematical/algorithmic/empirical
analyses together present (a) a systematic case study of
the interplay between influence dynamics and network
centrality based on Shapley and SNI centralities; (b)
axiomatic characterizations for two basic centralities that
precisely capture their similarities and differences; and (c)
new scalable algorithms for influence models. We believe
that the dual axiomatic-and-algorithmic characterization
provides a comparative framework for evaluating other
influence-based network concepts in the future.
For presentation clarity, we move the technical proofs
into the appendix, which also contains additional technical
materials for (algorithmic and axiomatic) generalization to
weighted influence models.
1.1 Related Work
Network centrality has been extensively studied (see [23]
and the references therein for a comprehensive introduction).
Most classical centralities, based on degree, closeness, be-
tweenness, eigenvector, are defined on static graphs. But
some also have dynamic interpretations based on random-
walks or network flows [8]. Eigenvector centrality [6] and
its closely related Katz-[17] and Alpha-centrality [7] can
be viewed as some forms of influence measures, since their
dynamic processes are non-conservative [15], meaning that
items could be replicated and propagated, similar to diffu-
sion of ideas, opinions, etc. PageRank [11, 25] and other
random-walk related centralities correspond to conservative
processes, and thus may not be suitable for propagation dy-
namics. Percolation centrality [27] also addresses diffusion
process, but its definition only involves static percolation.
None of above maps specific propagation models to network
centrality. Ghosh et al. [16] maps a linear dynamic process
characterized by parameterized Laplacian to centrality but
the social influence models we consider in this paper are be-
yond such linear dynamic framework. Michalak et al. use
Shapley value as network centrality [19], but they only con-
sider five basic network games based on local sphere of influ-
ence, and their algorithms run in (least) quadratic time. To
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to explicitly
map general social network influence propagation models to
network centrality.
Influence propagation has been extensively studied, but
most focusing on influence maximization tasks [18, 37, 12],
which aims to efficiently select a set of nodes with the largest
influence spread. The solution is not a centrality measure
and the seeds in the solution may not be the high centrality
nodes. Borgatti [9] provides clear conceptual discussions on
the difference between centralities and such key player set
identification problems. Algorithmically, our construction
extends the idea of reverse reachable sets, recently intro-
duced in [10, 34, 33] for scalable influence maximization.
In terms of axiomatic characterizations of network central-
ity, Sabidussi is the first who provides a set of axioms that
a centrality measure should satisfy [29]. A number of other
studies since then either provide other axioms that a central-
ity measure should satisfy (e.g. [24, 5, 30]) or a set of axioms
that uniquely define a centrality measure (e.g. [2] on PageR-
ank without the damping factor). All of these axiomatic
characterizations focus on static graph structures, while our
axiomatization focuses on the interplay between dynamic in-
fluence processes and static graph structures, and thus our
study fundamentally differs from all the above characteri-
zations. While we are heavily influenced by the axiomatic
characterization of the Shapley value [31], we are also in-
spired by social choice theory [3], and particularly by [26]
on measures of intellectual influence and [2] on PageRank.
2. INFLUENCE AND CENTRALITY
In this section, we review the basic concepts about social
influence models and Shapley value, and define the Shapley
and single node influence centrality measures.
2.1 Social Influence Models
A network-influence instance is usually specified by a
triple I = (V,E, PI), where a directed graph G = (V,E)
represents the structure of a social network, and PI defines
the influence model [18]. As an example, consider the classi-
cal discrete-time independent cascade (IC) model, in which
each directed edge (u, v) ∈ E has an influence probability
pu,v ∈ [0, 1]. At time 0, nodes in a given seed set S are
activated while other nodes are inactive. At time t ≥ 1,
for any node u activated at time t − 1, it has one chance
to activate each of its inactive out-neighbor v with an inde-
pendent probability pu,v. When there is no more activation,
the stochastic process ends with a random set I(S) of nodes
activated during the process. The influence spread of S is
σ(S) = E[|I(S)|], the expected number of nodes influenced
by S. Throughout the paper, we use boldface symbols to
represent random variables.
Algorithmically, we will focus on the (random) triggering
model [18], which has IC model as a special case. In this
model, each v ∈ V has a random triggering set T (v), drawn
from a distribution defined by the influence model over the
power set of all in-neighbors of v. At time t = 0, triggering
sets {T (v)}v∈V are drawn independently, and the seed set S
is activated. At t ≥ 1, if v is not active, it becomes activated
if some u ∈ T (v) is activated at time t − 1. The influence
spread of S is σ(S) = E[|I(S)|], where I(S) denotes the
random set activated by S. IC is the triggering model that:
For each directed edge (u, v) ∈ E, add u to T (v) with an
independent probability of pu,v. The triggering model can
be equivalently viewed under the live-edge graph model: (1)
Draw independent random triggering sets {T (v)}v∈V ; (2)
form a live-edge graph L = (V, {(u, v) : u ∈ T (v)}), where
(u, v), u ∈ T (v) is referred as a live edge. For any subgraph
L of G and S ⊆ V , let Γ(L, S) be the set of nodes in L
reachable from set S. Then set of active nodes with seed set
S is Γ(L, S), and influence spread σ(S) = EL[|Γ(L, S)|] =∑
L Pr(L = L) · |Γ(L, S)|. We say a set function f(·) is
monotone if f(S) ≤ f(T ) whenever S ⊆ T , and submodular
if f(S ∪ {v}) − f(S) ≥ f(T ∪ {v}) − f(T ) whenever S ⊆ T
and v 6∈ T . As shown in [18], in any triggering model, σ(·)
is monotone and submodular, because |Γ(L, S)| is monotone
and submodular for each graph L.
More generally, we define an influence instance as a triple
I = (V,E, PI), where G = (V,E) represents the underlying
network, and PI : 2V × 2V → R defines the probability
that in the influence process, any seed set S ⊆ V activates
exactly nodes in any target set T ⊆ V and no other nodes:
If II(S) denotes the random set activated by seed set S,
then Pr(II(S) = T ) = PI(S, T ). This probability profile
is commonly defined by a succinct influence model, such as
the triggering model, which interacts with network G. We
also require that: (a) PI(∅, ∅) = 1, PI(∅, T ) = 0, ∀T 6= ∅,
and (b) if S 6⊆ T then PI(S, T ) = 0, i.e., S always activates
itself (S ⊆ II(S)). Such model is also referred to as the
progressive influence model. The influence spread of S is:
σI(S) = E[|II(S)|] =
∑
T⊆V,S⊆T
PI(S, T ) · |T |.
2.2 Coalitional Games and Shapley Values
An n-person coalitional game over V = [n] is specified by
a characteristic function τ : 2V → R, where for any coalition
S ⊆ V , τ(S) denotes the cooperative utility of S. In cooper-
ative game theory, a ranking function φ is a mapping from a
characteristic function τ to a vector in Rn. A fundamental
solution concept of cooperative game theory is the ranking
function given by the Shapley value [31]: Let Π be the set
of all permutations of V . For any v ∈ V and pi ∈ Π, let Spi,v
denote the set of nodes in V preceding v in permutation pi.
Then, ∀v ∈ V :
φShapleyv (τ) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Π
(τ(Spi,v ∪ {v})− τ(Spi,v))
=
∑
S⊆V \{v}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(τ(S ∪ {v})− τ(S)) .
We use pi ∼ Π to denote that pi is a random permutation
uniformly drawn from Π. Then:
φShapleyv (τ) = Epi∼Π[τ(Spi,v ∪ {v})− τ(Spi,v)]. (2)
The Shapley value of v measures v’s marginal contribution
over the set preceding v in a random permutation.
Shapley [31] proved a remarkable representation theo-
rem: The Shapley value is the unique ranking function
that satisfies all the following four conditions: (1) Efficiency:∑
v∈V φv(τ) = τ(V ). (2) Symmetry: For any u, v ∈ V , if
τ(S∪{u}) = τ(S∪{v}), ∀S ⊆ V \{u, v}, then φu(τ) = φv(τ).
(3) Linearity: For any two characteristic functions τ and ω,
for any α, β > 0, φ(ατ + βω) = αφ(τ) + βφ(ω). (4) Null
Player: For any v ∈ V , if τ(S∪{v})−τ(S) = 0, ∀S ⊆ V \{v},
then φv(τ) = 0. Efficiency states that the total utility is fully
distributed. Symmetry states that two players’ ranking val-
ues should be the same if they have the identical marginal
utility profile. Linearity states that the ranking values of the
weighted sum of two coalitional games is the same as the
weighted sum of their ranking values. Null Player states that
a player’s ranking value should be zero if the player has zero
marginal utility to every subset.
2.3 Shapley and SNI Centrality
The influence-based centrality measure aims at assigning
a value for every node under every influence instance:
Definition 1 (Centrality Measure). An
(influence-based) centrality measure ψ is a mapping
from an influence instance I = (V,E, PI) to a real vector
(ψv(I))v∈V ∈ R|V |.
The single node influence (SNI) centrality, denoted by
ψSNIv (I), assigns the influence spread of node v as v’s cen-
trality measure: ψSNIv (I) = σI({v}).
The Shapley centrality, denoted by ψShapley(I), is
the Shapley value of the influence spread function σI :
ψShapley(I) = φShapley(σI). As a subtle point, note that
φShapley maps from a 2|V | dimensional τ to a |V |-dimensional
vector, while, formally, ψShapley maps from PI — whose di-
mensions is close to 22|V | — to a |V |-dimensional vector.
Figure 1: Example on Shapley and SNI centrality.
To help understand these definitions, Figure 1 provides a
simple example of a 3-node graph in the IC model with influ-
ence probabilities shown on the edges. The associated table
shows the result for Shapley and SNI centralities. While
SNI is straightforward in this case, the Shapley centrality
calculation already looks complex. For example, for node u,
its second term in the Shapley computation, 1
3
(1 − p) · 1.5,
accounts for the case where u is ordered in the second place
(with probability 1/3), in which case only when the first-
place node (either v or w) does not activate u (with prob-
ability 1 − p), it could have marginal influence of 1 in acti-
vating itself, and 0.5 in activating the remaining node. Sim-
ilarly, the third term for the Shapley computation for node
v accounts for the case where v is ordered second and w is
ordered first (with probability 1/6), in which case if w does
not activate u (with probability 1 − p), v’s marginal influ-
ence spread is 1 for itself and p for activating u; while if w
activates u (with probability p), only when u does not ac-
tivate v (with probability 0.5), v has marginal influence of
1 for itself. The readers can verify the rest. Based on the
result, we find that for interval p ∈ (1/2, 2/3), Shapley and
SNI centralities do not align in ranking: Shapley places v, w
higher than u while SNI puts u higher than v, w. This sim-
ple example already illustrates that (a) computing Shapley
centrality could be a nontrivial task; and (b) the relationship
between Shapley and SNI centralities could be complicated.
Addressing both the computation and characterization ques-
tions are the subject of the remaining sections.
3. AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION
In this section, we present two sets of axioms uniquely
characterizing Shapley and SNI centralities, respectively,
based on which we analyze their similarities and differences.
3.1 Axioms for Shapley Centrality
Our set of axioms for characterizing the Shapley centrality
is adapted from the classical Shapley’s axioms [31].
The first axiom states that labels on the nodes should have
no effect on centrality measures. This ubiquitous axiom is
similar to the isomorphic axiom in some other centrality
characterizations, e.g. [29].
Axiom 1 (Anonymity). For any influence instance
I = (V,E, PI), and permutation pi ∈ Π, ψv(I) =
ψpi(v)(pi(I)), ∀v ∈ V .
In Axiom 1, pi(I) = (pi(V ), pi(E), pi(PI)) denotes the isomor-
phic instance: (1) ∀u, v ∈ V , (pi(u), pi(v)) ∈ pi(E) iff (u, v) ∈
E, and (2) ∀S, T ⊆ V , PI(S, T ) = Ppi(I)(pi(S), pi(T )).
The second axiom states that the centrality measure di-
vides the total share of influence |V |. In other words, the
average centrality is normalized to 1.
Axiom 2 (Normalization). For every influence in-
stance I = (V,E, PI), ∑v∈V ψv(I) = |V |.
The next axiom characterizes the centrality of a type
of extreme nodes in social influence. In instance I =
(V,E, PI), we say v ∈ V is a sink node if ∀S, T ⊆ V \ {v},
PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = PI(S, T ) + PI(S, T ∪ {v}). In the
extreme case when S = T = ∅, PI({v}, {v}) = 1, i.e., v can
only influence itself. When v joins another S to form a seed
set, the influence to a target T ∪{v} can always be achieved
by S alone (except perhaps the influence to v itself). In
the triggering model, a sink node is (indeed) a node without
outgoing edges, matching the name “sink”.
Because a sink node v has no influence on other nodes,
we can “remove” it and obtain a projection of the influence
model on the network without v: Let I \{v} = (V \{v}, E \
{v}, PI\{v}) denote the projected instance over V \{v}, where
E \{v} = {(i, j) ∈ E : v 6∈ {i, j}} and PI\{v} is the influence
model such that for all S, T ⊆ V \ {v}:
PI\{v}(S, T ) = PI(S, T ) + PI(S, T ∪ {v}).
Intuitively, since sink node v is removed, the previously dis-
tributed influence from S to T and T ∪ {v} is merged into
the influence from S to T in the projected instance. For
the triggering model, influence projection is simply remov-
ing the sink node v and its incident incoming edges without
changing the triggering set distribution of any other nodes.
Axiom 3 below considers the simple case when the influ-
ence instance has two sink nodes u, v ∈ V . In such a case, u
and v have no influence to each other, and they influence no
one else. Thus, their centrality should be fully determined
by V \ {u, v}: Removing one sink node — say v — should
not affect the centrality measure of another sink node u.
Axiom 3 (Independence of Sink Nodes). For any
influence instance I = (V,E, PI), for any pair of sink nodes
u, v ∈ V in I, it should be the case: ψu(I) = ψu(I \ {v}).
The next axiom considers Bayesian social influence
through a given network: Given a graph G = (V,E), and
r influence instances on G: Iη = (V,E, PIη ) with η ∈ [r].
Let λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λr) be a prior distribution on [r], i.e.∑r
η=1 λη = 1, and λη ≥ 0, ∀η ∈ [r]. The Bayesian influ-
ence instance IB({Iη},λ) has the following influence process
for a seed set S ⊆ V : (1) Draw a random index η ∈ [r]
according to distribution λ (denoted as η ∼ λ). (2) Apply
the influence process of Iη with seed set S to obtain the
activated set T . Equivalently, we have for all S, T ⊆ V ,
PIB({Iη},λ)(S, T ) =
∑r
η=1 ληPIη (S, T ). In the triggering
model, we can view each live-edge graph and the determin-
istic diffusion on it via reachability as an influence instance,
and the diffusion of the triggering model is by the Bayesian
(or convex) combination of these live-edge instances. The
next axiom reflects the linearity-of-expectation principle:
Axiom 4 (Bayesian Influence). For any network
G = (V,E) and Bayesian social-influence model IB({Iη},λ):
ψv(IB({Iη},λ)) = Eη∼λ [ψv(Iη)] =
r∑
η=1
λη · ψv(Iη), ∀v ∈ V.
The above axiom essentially says that the centrality of a
Bayesian instance before realizing the actual model Iη is the
same as the expected centrality after realizing Iη.
The last axiom characterizes the centrality of a family of
simple social-influence instances. For any ∅ ⊂ R ⊆ U ⊆ V ,
a critical set instance IR,U = (V,E, PIR,U ) is such that:
(1) The network G = (V,E) contains a complete directed
bipartite sub-graph from R to U \R, together with isolated
nodes V \ U . (2) For all S ⊇ R, PIR,U (S,U ∪ S) = 1, and
(3) For all S 6⊇ R, PIR,U (S, S) = 1. In IR,U , R is called the
critical set, and U is called the target set. In other words, a
seed set containing R activates all nodes in U , but missing
any node in R the seed set only activates itself. We use IR,v
to denote the special case of U = R∪{v} and V = U . That
is, only if all nodes in R work together they can activate v.
Axiom 5 (Bargaining with Critical Sets). In any
critical set instance IR,v, the centrality of v is |R||R|+1 , i.e.
ψv(IR,v) = |R||R|+1 .
Qualitatively, Axiom 5 together with Normalization and
Anonymity axioms implies that the relative importance of v
comparing to a node in the critial set R increases when |R|
increases, which is reasonable because when the critical set
R grows, individuals in R becomes weaker and v becomes
relatively stronger. This axiom can be interpreted through
Nash’s solution [22] to the bargaining game between a player
representing the critical set R and the sink node v. Let
r = |R|. Player R can influence all nodes by itself, achieving
utility r + 1, while player v can only influence itself, with
utility 1. The threat point of this bargaining game is (r, 0),
which reflects the credits that each player agrees that the
other player should at least receive: Player v agrees that
player R’s contribution is at least r, while player R thinks
that player v may not have any contribution because R can
activate everyone. The slack in this threat point is ∆ =
r + 1 − (r + 0) = 1. However, in this case, player R is
actually a coalition of r nodes, and these r nodes have to
cooperate in order to influence all r+1 nodes — missing any
node in R will not influence v. The need to cooperative in
order to bargain with player v weakens player R. The ratio
of v’s bargaining weight to that of R is thus 1 to 1/r. Nash’s
bargaining solution [22] provides a fair division of this slack
between the two players:
(x1, x2) ∈ argmax
x1≥r,x2≥0,x1+x2=r+1
(x1 − r)1/r · x2.
The unique solution is (x1, x2) = (r+
1
r+1
, r
r+1
). Thus, node
v should receive a credit of r
r+1
, as stated in Axiom 5.
Our first axiomatic representation theorem can now be
stated as the following:
Theorem 1. (Axiomatic Characterization of
Shapley Centrality) The Shapley centrality ψShapley is
the unique centrality measure that satisfies Axioms 1-5.
Moreover, every axiom in this set is independent of others.
The soundness of this representation theorem — that the
Shapley centrality satisfies all axioms — is relatively sim-
ple. However, because of the intrinsic complexity in influ-
ence models, the uniqueness proof is in fact complex. We
give a high-level proof sketch here and the full proof is in
Appendix A.1. We follow Myerson’s proof strategy [21] of
Shapley’s theorem. The probabilistic profile PI of influence
instance I = (V,E, PI) is viewed as a vector in a large space
RM , where M is the number of independent dimensions in
PI . Bayesian Influence Axiom enforces that any conform-
ing centrality measure is an affine mapping from RM to Rn.
We then prove that the critical set instances IR,U form a
full-rank basis of the linear space RM . Finally, we prove
that any axiom-conforming centrality measure over critical
set instances (and the additional null instance in which ev-
ery node is a sink node) must be unique. The uniqueness
of the critical set instances and the null instance, the linear
independence of critical set instances in RM , plus the affine
mapping from RM to Rn, together imply that the centrality
measure of every influence instance is uniquely determined.
Our overall proof is more complex and — to a certain degree
— more subtle than Myerson’s proof, because our axiomatic
framework is based on the influence model in a much larger
dimensional space compared to the subset utility functions.
Finally, for independence, we need to show that for each ax-
iom, we can construct an alternative centrality measure if
the axiom is removed. Except for Axiom 5, the construc-
tions and the proofs for other axioms are nontrivial, and
they shed lights on how related centrality measures could
be formed when some conditions are relaxed.
3.2 Axioms for SNI Centrality
We first examine which of Axioms 1-5 are satisfied by SNI
centrality. It is easy to verify that Anonymity and Bayesian
Influence Axioms hold for SNI centrality. For the Indepen-
dence of Sink Node Axiom (Axiom 3), since every sink node
can only influence itself, its SNI centrality is 1. Thus, Ax-
iom 3 is satisfied by SNI because of a stronger reason.
For the Normalization Axiom (Axiom 2), the sum of sin-
gle node influence is typically more than the total number of
nodes (e.g., when the influence spread is submodular), and
thus Axiom 2 does not hold for SNI centrality. The Bar-
gaining with Critical Sets Axiom (Axiom 5) does not hold
either, since node v in IR,v is a sink node and thus its SNI
centrality is 1.
We now present our axiomatic characterization of SNI
centrality, which will retain Bayesian Influence Axiom 4,
strengthen Independence of Sink Node Axiom 3, and rechar-
acterize the centrality of a node in a critical set:
Axiom 6 (Uniform Sink Nodes). Every sink node
has centrality 1.
Axiom 7 (Critical Nodes). In any critical set in-
stance IR,U , the centrality of a node w ∈ R is 1 if |R| > 1,
and is |U | if |R| = 1.
These three axioms are sufficient to uniquely characterize
SNI centrality, as they also imply Anonymity Axiom:
Theorem 2. (Axiomatic Characterization of SNI
Centrality) The SNI centrality ψSNI is the unique cen-
trality measure that satisfies Axioms 4, 6, and 7. Moreover,
each of these axioms is independent of the others.
Theorems 1 and 2 establish the following appealing prop-
erty: Even though all our axioms are on probabilistic pro-
files PI of influence instances, the unique centrality measure
satisfying these axioms is in fact fully determined by the in-
fluence spread profile σI . We find this amazing because the
distribution profile PI has much higher dimensionality than
its influence-spread profile σI .
3.3 Shapley Centrality versus SNI Centrality
We now provide a comparative analysis between Shapley
and SNI centralities based on their definitions, axiomatic
characterizations, and various other properties they satisfy.
Comparison by definition. The definition of SNI cen-
trality is more straightforward as it uses individual node’s
influence spread as the centrality measure. Shapley cen-
trality is more sophisticatedly formulated, involving groups’
influence spreads. SNI centrality disregards the influence
profile of groups. Thus, it may limit its usage in more com-
plex situations where group influences should be considered.
Meanwhile, Shapley centrality considers group influence in
a particular way involving marginal influence of a node on
a given group randomly ordered before the node. Thus,
Shapley centrality is more suitable for assessing marginal
influence of a node in a group setting.
Comparison by axiomatic characterization. Both SNI
and Shapley centralities satisfy Anonymity, Independence of
Sink Nodes, and Bayesian Influence axioms, which seem to
be natural axioms for desirable social-influence centrality
measures. Their unique axioms characterize exactly their
differences. The first difference is on the Normalization Ax-
iom, satisfied by Shapley but not SNI centrality. This in-
dicates that Shapley centrality aims at dividing the total
share of possible influence spread |V | among all nodes, but
SNI centrality does not enforce such share division among
nodes. If we artificially normalize the SNI centrality values
of all nodes to satisfy the Normalization Axiom, the normal-
ized SNI centrality would not satisfy the Bayesian Influence
Axiom. (In fact, it is not easy to find a new characteriza-
tion for the normalized SNI centrality similar to Theorem 2.)
We will see shortly that the Normalization Axiom would also
cause a drastic difference between the two centrality mea-
sures for the symmetric IC influence model.
The second difference is on their treatment of sink nodes,
exemplified by sink nodes in the critical set instances. For
SNI centrality, sink nodes are always treated with the same
centrality of 1 (Axiom 6). But the Shapley centrality of a
sink node may be affected by other nodes that influence the
sink. In particular, for the critical set instance IR,v, v has
centrality |R|/(|R|+1), which increases with R. As discussed
earlier, larger R indicates v is getting stronger comparing to
nodes in R. In this aspect, Shapley centrality assignment is
sensible. Overall, when considering v’s centrality, SNI cen-
trality disregards other nodes’ influence to v while Shapley
centrality considers other nodes’ influence to v.
The third difference is their treatment of critical nodes in
the critical set instances. For SNI centrality, in the critical
set instance IR,v, Axiom 7 obliviously assigns the same value
1 for nodes u ∈ R whenever |R| > 1, effectively equalizing
the centrality of node u ∈ R with v. In contrast, Shapley
centrality would assign u ∈ R a value of 1 + 1|R|(|R|+1) , de-
creasing with R but is always larger than v’s centrality of
|R|
|R|+1 . Thus Shapley centrality assigns more sensible values
in this case, because u ∈ R as part of a coalition should have
larger centrality than v, who has no influence power at all.
We believe this shows the limitation of the SNI centrality —
it only considers individual influence and disregards group
influence. Since the critical set instances reflect the thresh-
old behavior in influence propagation — a node would be
influenced only after the number of its influenced neighbors
reach certain threshold — this suggests that SNI centrality
could be problematic in threshold-based influence models.
Comparison by additional properties. Finally, we
compare additional properties they satisfy. First, it is
straightforward to verify that both centrality measures sat-
isfy the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)) prop-
erty: If an instance I = (V,E, PI) is the union of two dis-
joint and independent influence instances, I1 = (V1, E1, PI1)
and I2 = (V2, E2, PI2), then for k ∈ {1, 2} and any v ∈ Vk:
ψv(I) = ψv(Ik).
The IIA property together with the Normalization Axiom
leads to a clear difference between SNI and Shapley central-
ity. Consider an example of two undirected and connected
graphs G1 with 10 nodes and G2 with 3 nodes, and the
IC model on them with edge probability 1. Both SNI and
Shapley centralities assign same values to nodes within each
graph, but due to normalization, Shapley assigns 1 to all
nodes, while SNI assigns 10 to nodes in G1 and 3 to nodes
in G2. The IIA property ensures that the centrality does
not change when we put G1 and G2 together. That is, SNI
considers nodes in G1 more important while Shapley consid-
ers them the same. While SNI centrality makes sense from
individual influence point of view, the view of Shapley cen-
trality is that a node in G1 is easily replaceable by any of
the other 9 nodes in G1 but a node in G2 is only replaceable
by two other nodes in G2. Shapley centrality uses marginal
influence in randomly ordered groups to determine that the
“replaceability factor” cancels out individual influence and
assigns same centrality to all nodes.
The above example generalizes to the symmetric IC model
where pu,v = pv,u, ∀u, v ∈ V : Every node has Shapley cen-
trality of 1 in such models. The technical reason is that
such models have an equivalent undirected live-edge graph
representation, containing a number of connected compo-
nents just like the above example. The Shapley symme-
try in the symmetric IC model may sound counter-intuitive,
since it appears to be independent of network structures or
edge probability values. But we believe what it unveils is
that symmetric IC model might be an unrealistic model in
practice — it is hard to imagine that between every pair
of individuals the influence strength is symmetric. For ex-
ample, in a star graph, when we perceive that the node in
the center has higher centrality, it is not just because of
its center position, but also because that it typically exerts
higher influence to its neighbors than the reverse direction.
This exactly reflects our original motivation that mere po-
sitions in a static network may not be an important factor
in determining the node centrality, and what important is
the effect of individual nodes participating in the dynamic
influence process.
From the above discussions, we clearly see that (a) SNI
centrality focuses on individual influence in isolation, while
(b) Shapley centrality focuses on marginal influence in group
influence settings, and measures the irreplaceability of the
nodes in some sense.
4. SCALABLE ALGORITHMS
In this section, we first give a sampling-based algorithm
for approximating the Shapley centrality ψShapley(I) of any
influence instance in the triggering model. We then give a
slight adaptation to approximate SNI centrality. In both
cases, we characterize the performance of our algorithms
and prove that they are scalable for a large family of social-
influence instances. In next section, we empirically show
that these algorithms are efficient for real-world networks.
4.1 Algorithm for Shapley Centrality
In this subsection, we use ψ as a shorthand for ψShapley.
Let n = |V | and m = |E|. To precisely state our result,
we make the following general computational assumption,
as in [34, 33]:
Assumption 1. The time to draw a random triggering
set T (v) is proportional to the in-degree of v.
The key combinatorial structures that we use are the fol-
lowing random sets generated by the reversed diffusion pro-
cess of the triggering model. A (random) reverse reachable
(RR) set R is generated as follows: (0) Initially, R = ∅. (1)
Select a node v ∼ V uniformly at random (called the root
of R), and add v to R. (2) Repeat the following process
until every node in R has a triggering set: For every u ∈ R
not yet having a triggering set, draw its random triggering
set T (u), and add T (u) to R. Suppose v ∼ V is selected
in Step (1). The reversed diffusion process uses v as the
seed, and follows the incoming edges instead of the outgoing
edges to iteratively “influence” triggering sets. Equivalently,
an RR set R is the set of nodes in a random live-edge graph
L that can reach node v.
The following key lemma elegantly connects RR sets with
Shapley centrality. We will defer its intuitive explanation to
the end of this section. Let pi be a random permutation on
V . Let I{E} be the indicator function for event E .
Lemma 1 (Shapley Centrality Identity). Let R
be a random RR set. Then, ∀u ∈ V , u’s Shapley centrality
is ψu = n · ER[I{u ∈ R}/|R|].
This lemma is instrumental to our scalable algorithm. It
guarantees that we can use random RR sets to build unbi-
ased estimators of Shapley centrality. Our algorithm ASV-
RR (standing for “Approximate Shapley Value by RR Set”)
is presented in Algorithm 1. It takes ε, `, and k as input
parameters, representing the relative error, the confidence
of the error, and the number of nodes with top Shapley val-
ues that achieve the error bound, respectively. Their exact
meaning will be made clear in Theorem 3.
ASV-RR follows the structure of the IMM algorithm of
[33] but with some key differences. In Phase 1, Algorithm 1
estimates the number of RR sets needed for the Shapley es-
timator. For a given parameter k, we first estimate a lower
bound LB of the k-th largest Shapley centrality ψ(k). Fol-
lowing a similar structure as the sampling method in IMM
[33], the search of the lower bound is carried out in at most
blog2 nc−1 iterations, each of which halves the lower bound
target x = n/2i and obtains the number of RR sets θi needed
in this iteration (line 6). The key difference is that we do
not need to store the RR sets and compute a max cover.
Instead, for every RR set R, we only update the estimate
estu of each node u ∈ R with an additional 1/|R| (line 9),
which is based on Lemma 1. In each iteration, we select the
k-th largest estimate (line 11) and plug it into the condition
in line 12. Once the condition holds, we calculate the lower
bound LB in line 13 and break the loop. Next we use this
LB to obtain the number of RR sets θ needed in Phase 2
(line 17). In Phase 2, we first reset the estimates (line 19),
then generate θ RR sets and again updating estu with 1/|R|
increment for each u ∈ R (line 22). Finally, these estimates
are transformed into the Shapley estimation in line 24.
Unlike IMM, we do not reuse the RR sets generated in
Phase 1, because it would make the RR sets dependent and
the resulting Shapley centrality estimates biased. Moreover,
our entire algorithm does not need to store any RR sets, and
Input: Network: G = (V,E); Parameters: random trigger-
ing set distribution {T (v)}v∈V , ε > 0, ` > 0, k ∈ [n]
Output: ψˆv, ∀v ∈ V : estimated centrality measure
1: {Phase 1. Estimate the number of RR sets needed }
2: LB = 1; ε′ =
√
2 · ε; θ0 = 0
3: estv = 0 for every v ∈ V
4: for i = 1 to blog2 nc − 1 do
5: x = n/2i
6: θi =
⌈
n·((`+1) lnn+ln log2 n+ln 2)·(2+ 23 ε′)
ε′2·x
⌉
7: for j = 1 to θi − θi−1 do
8: generate a random RR set R
9: for every u ∈ R, estu = estu + 1/|R|
10: end for
11: est (k) = the k-th largest value in {estv}v∈V
12: if n · est (k)/θi ≥ (1 + ε′) · x then
13: LB = n · est (k)/(θi · (1 + ε′))
14: break
15: end if
16: end for
17: θ =
⌈
n((`+1) lnn+ln 4)(2+ 2
3
ε)
ε2·LB
⌉
18: {Phase 2. Estimate Shapley value}
19: estv = 0 for every v ∈ V
20: for j = 1 to θ do
21: generate a random RR set R
22: for every u ∈ R, estu = estu + 1/|R|
23: end for
24: for every v ∈ V , ψˆv = n · estv/θ
25: return ψˆv, v ∈ V
Algorithm 1: ASV-RR(G,T , ε, `, k)
thus ASV-RR does not have the memory bottleneck encoun-
tered by IMM when dealing with large networks. The follow-
ing theorem summarizes the performance of Algorithm 1,
where ψ and ψ(k) are Shapley centrality and k-th largest
Shapley centrality value, respectively.
Theorem 3. For any  > 0, ` > 0, and k ∈ [n], Algo-
rithm ASV-RR returns an estimated Shapley value ψˆv that
satisfies (a) unbiasedness: E[ψˆv] = ψv, ∀v ∈ V ; (b) absolute
normalization:
∑
v∈V ψˆv = n in every run; and (c) robust-
ness: under the condition that ψ(k) ≥ 1, with probability at
least 1− 1
n`
:{ |ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εψv ∀v ∈ V with ψv > ψ(k),
|ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εψ(k) ∀v ∈ V with ψv ≤ ψ(k).
(3)
Under Assumption 1 and the condition ` ≥ (log2 k −
log2 log2 n)/ log2 n, the expected running time of ASV-RR is
O(`(m+n) logn ·E[σ(v˜)]/(ψ(k)ε2)), where E[σ(v˜)] is the ex-
pected influence spread of a random node v˜ drawn from V
with probability proportional to the in-degree of v˜.
Eq. (3) above shows that for the top k Shapley values,
ASV-RR guarantees the multiplicative error of ε relative to
node’s own Shapley value (with high probability), and for
the rest Shapley value, the error is relative to the k-th largest
Shapley value ψ(k). This is reasonable since typically we
only concern nodes with top Shapley values. For time com-
plexity, the condition ` ≥ (log2 k−log2 log2 n)/ log2 n always
hold if k ≤ log2 n or ` ≥ 1. When fixing ε as a constant,
the running time depends almost linearly on the graph size
(m + n) multiplied by a ratio E[σ(v˜)]/ψ(k). This ratio is
upper bounded by the ratio between the largest single node
influence and the k-th largest Shapley value. When these
two quantities are about the same order, we have a near-
linear time, i.e., scalable [35], algorithm. Our experiments
show that in most datasets tested the ratio E[σ(v˜)]/ψ(k) is
indeed less than 1. Moreover, if we could relax the robust-
ness requirement in Eq. (3) to allow the error of |ψˆv − ψv|
to be relative to the largest single node influence, then we
could indeed slightly modify the algorithm to obtain a near-
linear-time algorithm without the ratio E[σ(v˜)]/ψ(k) in the
time complexity (see Appendix C.5).
The accuracy of ASV-RR is based on Lemma 1 while
the time complexity analysis follows a similar structure as
in [33]. The proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 3 are presented
in Appendix C. Here, we give a high-level explanation. In
the triggering model, as for influence maximization [10, 34,
33], a random RR set R can be equivalently obtained by
first generating a random live-edge graph L, and then con-
structing R as the set of nodes that can reach a random
v ∼ V in L. The fundamental equation associated with this
live-edge graph process is:
σ(S) =
∑
L
Pr
L
(L = L) Pr
v
(v ∈ Γ(L, S)) · n. (4)
Our Lemma 1 is the result of the following crucial observa-
tions: First, the Shapley centrality ψu of node u ∈ V can be
equivalently formulated as the expected Shapley centrality
of u over all live-edge graphs and random choices of root
v, from Eq. (4). The chief advantage of this formulation
is that it localizes the contribution of marginal influences:
On a fixed live-graph L and root v ∈ V , we only need to
compute the marginal influence of u in terms of activating
v to obtain the Shapley contribution of the pair. We do not
need to compute the marginal influences of u for activating
other nodes. Lemma 1 then follows from our second cru-
cial observation. When R is the fixed set that can reach v
in L, the marginal influence of u activating v in a random
order is 1 if and only if the following two conditions hold
concurrently: (a) u is in R — so u has chance to activate
v, and (b) u is ordered before any other node in R — so u
can activate v before other nodes in R do so. In addition, in
a random permutation pi ∼ Π over V , the probability that
u ∈ R is ordered first in R is exactly 1/|R|. This explains
the contribution of I{u ∈ R}/|R| in Lemma 1, which is also
precisely what the updates in lines 9 and 22 of Algorithm 1
do. The above two observations together establish Lemma
1, which is the basis for the unbiased estimator of u’s Shap-
ley centrality. Then, by a careful probabilistic analysis, we
can bound the number of random RR sets needed to achieve
approximation accuracy stated in Theorem 3 and establish
the scalability for Algorithm ASV-RR.
4.2 Algorithm for SNI Centrality
Algorithm 1 relies on the key fact given in Lemma 1 about
the Shapley centrality: ψShapleyu = n · ER[I{u ∈ R}/|R|]. A
similar fact holds for the SNI centrality: ψSNIu = σ({u}) =
n ·ER[I{u ∈ R}] [10, 34, 33]. Therefore, it is not difficult to
verify that we only need to replace estu = estu + 1/|R| in
lines 9 and 22 with estu = estu + 1 to obtain an approx-
imation algorithm for SNI centrality. Let ASNI-RR denote
the algorithm adapted from ASV-RR with the above change,
and let ψv below denote SNI centrality ψ
SNI
v and ψ
(k) denote
the k-th largest SNI value.
Table 1: Datasets used in the experiments. “#
Edges” refers to the number of undirected edges for
the first three datasets and the number of directed
edges for the last dataset.
Dataset # Nodes # Edges Weight Setting
Data mining (DM) 679 1687 WC, PR, LN
Flixster (FX) 29,357 212,614 LN
DBLP (DB) 654,628 1,990,159 WC, PR
LiveJournal (LJ) 4,847,571 68,993,773 WC
Theorem 4. For any  > 0, ` > 0, and k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
Algorithm ASNI-RR returns an estimated SNI centrality ψˆv
that satisfies (a) unbiasedness: E[ψˆv] = ψv, ∀v ∈ V ; and (b)
robustness: with probability at least 1− 1
n`
:{ |ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εψv ∀v ∈ V with ψv > ψ(k),
|ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εψ(k) ∀v ∈ V with ψv ≤ ψ(k).
(5)
Under Assumption 1 and the condition ` ≥ (log2 k −
log2 log2 n)/ log2 n, the expected running time of ASNI-RR
is O(`(m+ n) logn · E[σ(v˜)]/(ψ(k)ε2)), where E[σ(v˜)] is the
same as defined in Theorem 1.
Together with Algorithm ASV-RR and Theorem 3, we see
that although Shapley and SNI centrality are quite different
conceptually, surprisingly they share the same RR-set based
scalable computation structure. Comparing Theorem 4 with
Theorem 3, we can see that computing SNI centrality should
be faster for small k since the k-th largest SNI value is usu-
ally larger than the k-th largest Shapley value.
5. EXPERIMENTS
We conduct experiments on a number of real-world social
networks to compare their Shapley and SNI centrality, and
test the efficiency of our algorithms ASV-RR and ASNI-RR.
5.1 Experiment Setup
The network datasets we used are summarized in Table 1.
The first dataset is a relatively small one used as a case
study. It is a collaboration network in the field of Data
Mining (DM), extracted from the ArnetMiner archive (ar-
netminer.org) [32]: each node is an author and two authors
are connected if they have coauthored a paper. The mapping
from node ids to author names is available, allowing us to
gain some intuitive observations of the centrality measure.
We use three large networks to demonstrate the effective-
ness of the Shapley and SNI centrality and the scalability of
our algorithms. Flixster (FX) [4] is a directed network ex-
tracted from movie rating site flixster.com. The nodes are
users and a directed edge from u to v means that v has rated
some movie(s) that u rated earlier. Both network and the
influence probability profile are obtained from the authors
of [4], which shows how to learn topic-aware influence prob-
abilities. We use influence probabilities on topic 1 in their
provided data as an example. DBLP (DB) is another aca-
demic collaboration network extracted from online archive
DBLP (dblp.uni-trier.de) and used for influence studies in
[37]. Finally, LiveJournal (LJ) is the largest network we
tested with. It is a directed network of bloggers, obtained
from Stanford’s SNAP project [1], and it was also used in
[34, 33].
Table 2: Top 10 authors from DM dataset, ranked by Shapley, SNI, and degree centrality.
We use the independent cascade (IC) model in our exper-
iments. The schemes for generating influence-probability
profiles are also shown in Table 1, where WC, PR, and
LN stand for weighted cascade, PageRank-based, and learned
from real data, respectively. WC is a scheme of [18], which
assigns pu,v = 1/dv to edge (u, v) ∈ E, where dv is the
in-degree of node v. PR uses the nodes’ PageRanks [11] in-
stead of in-degrees: We first compute the PageRank score
r(v) for every node v ∈ V in the unweighted network, us-
ing 0.15 as the restart parameter. Note that in our influ-
ence network, edge (u, v) means u has influence to v; then
when computing PageRank, we should reverse the edge di-
rection to (v, u) so that v gives its PageRank vote to u, in
order to be consistent on influence direction. Then, for each
original edge (u, v) ∈ E, PR assigns an edge probability of
r(u)/(r(u) + r(v)) · n/(2mU ), where mU is the number of
undirected edges in the graph. The assignment achieves the
effect that a higher PageRank node has larger influence to a
lower PageRank nodes than the reverse direction (when both
directions exist). The scaling factor n/(2mU ) is to normalize
the total edge probabilities to Θ(n), which is similar to the
setting of WC. PR defines a PageRank-based asymmetric IC
model. LN applies to DM and FX datasets, where we obtain
learned influence probability profiles from the authors of the
original studies. For the DM dataset, the influence proba-
bilities on edges are learned by the topic affinity algorithm
TAP proposed in [32]; for FX, the influence probabilities
are learned using maximum likelihood from the action trace
data of user rating events.
We implement all algorithms in Visual C++, compiled in
Visual Studio 2013, and run our tests on a server computer
with 2.4GHz Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5530 CPU, 2 processors (16
cores), 48G memory, and Windows Server 2008 R2 (64 bits).
5.2 Experiment Results
Case Study on DM. We set ε = 0.01, ` = 1, and k = 50
for both ASV-RR and and ASNI-RR algorithms. For the three
influence profiles: WC, PR, and LN, Table 2 lists the top 10
nodes in both Shapley and SNI ranking together with their
numerical values. The names appeared in all ranking results
are well-known data mining researchers in the field, at the
time of the data collection 2009, but the ranking details have
some difference.
We compare the Shapley ranking versus SNI ranking un-
der the same probability profiles. In general, the two top-10
ranking results align quite well with each other, showing
that in these influence instances, high individual influence
usually translates into high marginal influence. Some notice-
able exception also exists. For example, Christos Faloutsos
is ranked No.3 in the DM-PR Shapley centrality, but he is
not in Top-10 based on DM-PR individual influence ranking.
Conceptually, this would mean that, in the DM-PR model,
Professor Faloutsos has better Shapley ranking because he
has more unique and marginal impact comparing to his in-
dividual influence. In terms of the numerical values, SNI
values are larger than the Shapley values, which is expected
due to the normalization factor in Shapley centrality.
We next compare Shapley and SNI centrality with the
structure-based degree centrality. The results show that the
Shapley and SNI rankings in DM-WC and DM-PR are sim-
ilar to the degree centrality ranking, which is reasonable be-
cause DM-WC and DM-PR are all heavily derived from node
degrees. However, DM-LN differs from degree ranking a lot,
since it is derived from topic modeling, not node degrees.
This implies that when the influence model parameters are
learned from real-world data, it may contain further infor-
mation such that its influence-based Shapley or SNI ranking
may differ from structure-based ranking significantly.
When comparing the numerical values of the same cen-
trality measure but across different influence models, we
see that Shapley values of top researchers in DM-LN are
much higher than Shapley values of top researchers under
DM-WC or DM-PR, which suggests that influence models
learned from topic profiles differentiating nodes more than
the synthetic WC or PR methods.
The above results differentiating DM-LN from DM-WC
and DM-PR clearly demonstrate the interplay between so-
cial influence and network centrality: Different influence
processes can lead to different centrality rankings, but when
they share some aspects of common “ground-truth” influ-
ence, their induced rankings are more closely correlated.
Tuning Parameter ε
We now investigate the impact of our ASV-RR/ASNI-RR pa-
rameters, to be applied to our tests on large datasets. Pa-
rameter ` is a simple parameter controlling the probability,
1 − 1
n`
, that the accuracy guarantee holds. We set it to 1,
which is the same as in [34, 33]. For parameter ε, a smaller
value improves accuracy at the cost of higher running time.
Thus, we want to set ε at a proper level to balance accuracy
and efficiency.
(a) Shapley computation (b) SNI computation
Figure 2: Relative error of centrality computation
when ε setting increases.
We test different ε values from 0.1 to 2, on both DM and
FX datasets, for both algorithms. To evaluate the accuracy,
we use the results from ε∗ = 0.01 as the benchmark: For
v ∈ V , suppose s∗v and sv are the Shapley values computed
for ε∗ = 0.01 and a larger ε value, respectively. Then, we
compute |sv − s∗v|/s∗v and use it as the relative error at v.
Since the top rankers’ relative errors are more important, we
take top 50 nodes from the two ranking results (using ε∗ and
ε respectively), and compute the average relative error over
the union of these two sets of top 50 nodes. Accordingly, we
set parameter k = 50. We also apply the same relative error
computation to SNI centrality.
Figure 2 reports our results on the three DM options and
the FX dataset, for both Shapley and SNI computations.
We can see clearly that when ε ≤ 0.5, the relative errors of
all datasets are within 0.05. In general, the actual relative
error is below one tenth of ε in most cases, except for DM-PR
dataset with ε ≥ 1. Hence, for the tests on large datasets,
we use ε = 0.5 to provide reasonable accuracy for top values.
Comparing to ε = 0.01, this reduces the running time 2500
fold, because the running time is proportional to 1/ε2.
Results on Large Networks. We conduct experiments
to evaluate both the effectiveness and the efficiency of our
ASV-RR algorithm on large networks. For large networks,
it is no longer easy to inspect rankings manually, especially
when these datasets lack user profiles. For the effective-
ness, we assess the effectiveness of Shapley and SNI cen-
trality rankings through the lens of influence maximization.
In particular, we use top rankers of Shapley/SNI centrality
as seeds and measure their effectiveness for influence maxi-
mization. We compare the quality and performance of our
algorithm with the state-of-the-art scalable algorithm IMM
proposed in [33] for influence maximization. Note that the
IMM algorithm is based on the RR set approach. For IMM,
we set its parameters as ε = 0.5, ` = 1, and k = 50, match-
ing the parameter settings we use for ASV-RR/ASNI-RR. We
also choose a baseline algorithm Degree, which is based on
degree centrality to select top degree nodes as seeds for in-
fluence maximization.
We run ASV-RR, ASNI-RR, IMM, and Degree on four influ-
ence instances: (1) the Flixster network with learned prob-
ability, (2) the DBLP network with WC parameters, (3)
the DBLP network with PR parameters, and (4) the Live-
Journal network with WC parameters. Figure 3 shows the
results of these four tests whose objectives are to identify 50
influential seed nodes. The influence spread in each case is
obtained by running 10K Monte Carlo simulations and tak-
ing the average value. The results on all datasets in general
show that both Shapley and SNI centrality performs reason-
ably well for the influence maximization task, but in some
cases IMM is still noticeably better. This is because IMM is
specially designed for the influence maximization task while
Shapley and SNI are two centrality measures related to in-
fluence but not specialized for the influence maximization
task. For the FX-LN dataset, Shapley top rankers performs
noticeably better than SNI top rankers (average 8.3% im-
provement). This is perhaps due to that Shapley centrality
accounts for more marginal influence, which is closer to what
is needed for influence maximization. This is also the test
where they both significantly outperform the baseline De-
gree heuristic, again indicating that influence learned from
the real-world data may contain significantly more informa-
tion than the graph structure, in which case degree centrality
is not a good index for node importance.
The behavior of DBLP-PR needs a bit more attention. For
ASNI-RR (as well as IMM and Degree), the first seed selected
already generates influence spread of 95K, but subsequent
seeds only have very small marginal contribution to the in-
fluence spread. On the contrary, the first seed selected by
ASV-RR only has influence spread of 77K, and the spread
reaches the level of ASNI-RR at the fourth seed. Looking
more closely, the first seed selected by ASV-RR has Shap-
ley centrality of 10.3 but its influence spread of 77K is only
ranked at around 68K on SNI ranking, while the first seed of
ASNI-RR has Shapley centrality of 3.15, with Shapley rank-
ing beyond 2100. This shows that when a large portion of
nodes have high individual but overlapping influence (due to
the emergence of the giant component in live-edge graphs),
they all become more or less replaceable, and thus Shapley
ranking, which focuses on marginal influence in a random
order, would differs from SNI ranking significantly.
Finally, we evaluate the scalability of ASV-RR and ASNI-
RR, and use IMM as a reference point, even though IMM
is designed for a different task. We use the same setting
of ε = 0.5, ` = 1, and k = 50. Table 3 reports the running
time of the three algorithms on four large influence instances.
For FX-LN, DB-WC, and LJ-WC, the general trend is that
IMM is the fastest, followed by ASNI-RR, and then ASV-RR.
This is expected, because the theoretical running time of
IMM is Θ((k+ `)(m+ n) logn ·E[σ(v˜)]/(OPTk · ε2)), where
OPTk is maximum influence spread with k seeds. Thus
comparing to the running time results in Theorems 3 and 4,
typically OPTk is much larger than the k-th largest SNI
centrality, which in turn is much larger than the k-th largest
Shapley centrality, which leads to the observed running time
result. Nevertheless, both ASNI-RR and ASV-RR could be
considered efficient in these cases and they can scale to large
graphs with tens of millions of nodes and edges.
DB-PR again is an out-lier, with ASNI-RR faster than
IMM, and ASV-RR being too slow and inefficient. This is
because a large portion of nodes have large individual but
overlapping influence, so that OPT50 = 95.9K is almost the
same as the 50-th largest SNI value (94.2K), in which case
the (k+`) factor in the running time of IMM dominates and
makes IMM slower than ASNI-RR. As for ASV-RR, due to the
severe overlapping influence, the 50-th largest Shapley value
(5.10) is much smaller than the 50-th largest SNI value or
OPT50, resulting in much slower running time for ASV-RR.
In summary, our experimental results on small and large
datasets demonstrate that (a) Shapley and SNI centrality
(a) Flixster-LN (b) DBLP-WC (c) DBLP-PR (d) LiveJournal-WC
Figure 3: Influence maximization test on IMM, ASV-RR, and Degree.
Table 3: Running time (in seconds).
Algorithm FX-LN DB-WC DB-PR LJ-WC
ASV-RR 24.83 838.27 594752 8295.57
ASNI-RR 1.36 61.41 28.42 267.50
IMM 0.62 18.08 336.63 54.88
behaves similarly in these networks, but with noticeable
differences; (b) for the influence maximization task, they
perform close to the specially designed IM algorithm, with
Shapley centrality noticeably better than SNI in some case;
and (c) both can scale to large graphs with tens of millions of
edges, with ASNI-RR having better scalability. except that
ASV-RR would not be efficient for graphs with a huge gap be-
tween individual influence and marginal influence. Finally,
we remark that ASV-RR and ASNI-RR do not need to store
RR sets, which eliminates a memory bottleneck that could
be encountered by IMM on large datasets.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Through an integrated mathematical, algorithmic, and
empirical study of Shapley and SNI centralities in the con-
text of network influence, we have shown that (a) both en-
joy concise axiomatic characterizations, which precisely cap-
ture their similarity and differences; (b) both centrality mea-
sures can be efficiently approximated with guarantees under
the same algorithmic structure, for a large class of influ-
ence models; and (c) Shapley centrality focuses on nodes’
marginal influence and their irreplaceability in group influ-
ence settings, while SNI centrality focuses on individual in-
fluence in isolation, and is not suitable in assessing nodes’
ability in group influence setting, such as threshold-based
models.
There are several directions to extend this work and fur-
ther explore the interplay between social influence and net-
work centrality. One important direction is to formulate
centrality measures that combine the advantages of Shapley
and SNI centralities, by viewing Shapley and SNI centrali-
ties as two extremes in a centrality spectrum, one focusing
on individual influence while the other focusing on marginal
influence in groups of all sizes. Then, would there be some
intermediate centrality measure that provides a better bal-
ance? Another direction is to incorporate other classical
centralities into influence-based centralities. For example,
SNI centrality may be viewed as a generalized version of de-
gree centrality, because when we restrict the influence model
to deterministic activation of only immediate neighbors, SNI
centrality essentially becomes degree centrality. What about
the general forms of closeness, betweenness, PageRank in the
influence model? Algorithmically, efficient algorithms for
other influence models such as general threshold models [18]
is also interesting. In summary, this paper lays a foundation
for the further development of the axiomatic and algorith-
mic theory for influence-based network centralities, which
we hope will provide us with deeper insights into network
structures and influence dynamics.
Acknowledgment
We thank Tian Lin for sharing his IMM implementation
code and helping on data preparation. We thank David
Kempe and four anonymous reviewers for their valuable
feedback. Wei Chen is partially supported by the National
Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61433014).
Shang-Hua Teng is supported in part by a Simons Investiga-
tor Award from the Simons Foundation and by NSF grant
CCF-1111270.
7. REFERENCES
[1] Stanford network analysis project.
https://snap.stanford.edu/data/.
[2] A. Altman and M. Tennenholtz. Ranking systems:
The pagerank axioms. In ACM, EC ’05, pages 1–8,
2005.
[3] K. J. Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Values.
Wiley, New York, 2nd edition, 1963.
[4] N. Barbieri, F. Bonchi, and G. Manco. Topic-aware
social influence propagation models. In ICDM, 2012.
[5] P. Boldi and S. Vigna. Axioms for centrality. Internet
Mathematics, 10:222–262, 2014.
[6] P. Bonacich. Factoring and weighting approaches to
status scores and clique identification,. Journal of
Mathematical Sociology, 2:113–120, 1972.
[7] P. Bonacich. Power and centrality: A family of
measures. American Journal of Sociology,
92(5):1170–1182, 1987.
[8] S. P. Borgatti. Centrality and network flow. Social
Networks, 27(1):55–71, 2005.
[9] S. P. Borgatti. Identifying sets of key players in a
social network. Computational and Mathematical
Organizational Theory, 12:21–34, 2006.
[10] C. Borgs, M. Brautbar, J. Chayes, and B. Lucier.
Maximizing social influence in nearly optimal time. In
ACM-SIAM, SODA ’14, pages 946–957, 2014.
[11] S. Brin and L. Page. The anatomy of a large-scale
hypertextual web search engine. Computer Networks,
30(1-7):107–117, 1998.
[12] W. Chen, Y. Yuan, and L. Zhang. Scalable influence
maximization in social networks under the linear
threshold model. In IEEE, ICDM ’10, pages 88–97,
2010.
[13] F. R. K. Chung and L. Lu. Concentration inequalities
and martingale inequalities: A survey. Internet
Mathematics, 3(1):79–127, 2006.
[14] P. Domingos and M. Richardson. Mining the network
value of customers. In ACM, KDD ’01, pages 57–66,
2001.
[15] R. Ghosh and K. Lerman. Rethinking centrality: The
role of dynamical processes in social network analysis.
Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems Series B,
pages 1355–1372, 2014.
[16] R. Ghosh, S.-H. Teng, K. Lerman, and X. Yan. The
interplay between dynamics and networks: centrality,
communities, and cheeger inequality. In ACM, KDD
’14, pages 1406–1415, 2014.
[17] L. Katz. A new status index derived from sociometric
analysis. Psychometrika, 18(1):39–43, March 1953.
[18] D. Kempe, J. M. Kleinberg, and E´. Tardos.
Maximizing the spread of influence through a social
network. In KDD, pages 137–146, 2003.
[19] T. P. Michalak, K. V. Aadithya, P. L. Szczepanski,
B. Ravindran, and N. R. Jennings. Efficient
computation of the shapley value for game-theoretic
network centrality. J. Artif. Int. Res., 46(1):607–650,
Jan. 2013.
[20] M. Mitzenmacher and E. Upfal. Probability and
Computing. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[21] R. B. Myerson. Game Theory : Analysis of Conflict.
Harvard University Press, 1997.
[22] J. Nash. The bargaining problem. Econometrica,
18(2):155–162, April 1950.
[23] M. Newman. Networks: An Introduction. Oxford
University Press, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 2010.
[24] U. Nieminen. On the centrality in a directed graph.
Social Science Research, 2(4):371–378, 1973.
[25] L. Page, S. Brin, R. Motwani, and T. Winograd. The
pagerank citation ranking: Bringing order to the web.
In Proceedings of the 7th International World Wide
Web Conference, pages 161–172, 1998.
[26] I. Palacios-Huerta and O. Volij. The measurement of
intellectual influence. Econometrica, 72:963–977, 2004.
[27] M. Piraveenan, M. Prokopenko, and L. Hossain.
Percolation centrality: Quantifying graph-theoretic
impact of nodes during percolation in networks. PLoS
ONE, 8(1), 2013.
[28] M. Richardson and P. Domingos. Mining
knowledge-sharing sites for viral marketing. In ACM,
KDD ’02, pages 61–70, 2002.
[29] G. Sabidussi. The centrality index of a graph.
Psychometrika, 31(4):581–603, 1966.
[30] D. Schoch and U. Brandes. Re-conceptualizing
centrality in social networks. European Journal of
Applied Mathematics, 27:971–985, 2016.
[31] L. S. Shapley. A value for n-person games. In H. Kuhn
and A. Tucker, editors, Contributions to the Theory of
Games, Volume II, pages 307–317. Princeton
University Press, 1953.
[32] J. Tang, J. Sun, C. Wang, and Z. Yang. Social
influence analysis in large-scale networks. In KDD,
2009.
[33] Y. Tang, Y. Shi, and X. Xiao. Influence maximization
in near-linear time: a martingale approach. In
SIGMOD, pages 1539–1554, 2015.
[34] Y. Tang, X. Xiao, and Y. Shi. Influence maximization:
near-optimal time complexity meets practical
efficiency. In SIGMOD, pages 75–86, 2014.
[35] S.-H. Teng. Scalable algorithms for data and network
analysis. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical
Computer Science, 12(1-2):1–261, 2016.
[36] S.-H. Teng. Network essence: Pagerank completion
and centrality-conforming markov chains. In J. N.
Martin Loebl and R. Thomas, editors, A Journey
through Discrete Mathematics. A Tribute to Jirˇ´ı
Matousˇek. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2017.
[37] C. Wang, W. Chen, and Y. Wang. Scalable influence
maximization for independent cascade model in
large-scale social networks. DMKD, 25(3):545–576,
2012.
APPENDIX
A. PROOFS ON AXIOMATIC CHARAC-
TERIZATION
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We use A to denote the set of Axioms 1-5.
Analysis of Sink Nodes
We first prove that the involvement of sink nodes in the in-
fluence process is what we have expected: (1) The marginal
contribution of a sink node v is equal to the probability that
v is not influenced by the seed set. (2) For any other node
u ∈ V , u’s activation probability is the same whether or not
v is in the seed set.
Lemma 2. Suppose v is a sink node in I = (V,E, PI).
Then, (a) for any S ⊆ V \ {v}:
σI(S ∪ {v})− σI(S) = Pr(v 6∈ II(S)).
(b) for any u 6= v and any S ⊆ V \ {u, v}:
Pr(u 6∈ II(S ∪ {v})) = Pr(u 6∈ II(S)).
Proof. For (a), by the definitions of σI and sink nodes:
σI(S ∪ {v})
=
∑
T⊇S∪{v}
PI(S ∪ {v}, T ) · |T |
=
∑
T⊇S∪{v}
(PI(S, T \ {v}) + PI(S, T )) · |T |
=
∑
T⊇S,T⊆V \{v}
PI(S, T )(|T |+ 1) +
∑
T⊇S∪{v}
PI(S, T ) · |T |
=
∑
T⊇S
PI(S, T ) · |T |+
∑
T⊇S,T⊆V \{v}
PI(S, T )
= σI(S) + Pr(v 6∈ II(S)).
For (b),
Pr(u 6∈ II(S ∪ {v}))
=
∑
T⊇S∪{v},T⊆V \{u}
PI(S ∪ {v}, T )
=
∑
T⊇S∪{v},T⊆V \{u}
(PI(S, T \ {v}) + PI(S, T ))
=
∑
T⊇S,T⊆V \{u}
PI(S, T ) = Pr(u 6∈ II(S)).
Lemma 2 immediately implies that for any two sink nodes
u and v, u’s marginal contribution to any S ⊆ V \ {u, v} is
the same as its marginal contribution to S ∪ {v}:
Lemma 3 (Independence between Sink Nodes). If
u and v are two sink nodes in I, then for any S ⊆ V \{u, v},
σI(S ∪ {v, u})− σI(S ∪ {v}) = σI(S ∪ {u})− σI(S).
Proof. By Lemma 2 (a) and (b), both sides are equal to
Pr(u 6∈ II(S)).
The next two lemmas connect the influence spreads in the
original and projected instances.
Lemma 4. If v is a sink in I, then for any S ⊆ V \ {v}:
σI\{v}(S) = σI(S)− Pr(v ∈ II(S)).
Proof. By the definition of influence projection:
σI\{v}(S)
=
∑
T⊇S,T⊆V \{v}
PI\{v}(S, T ) · |T |
=
∑
T⊇S,T⊆V \{v}
(PI(S, T ) + PI(S, T ∪ {v})) · |T |
=
∑
T⊇S,T⊆V \{v}
PI(S, T ) · |T |+
∑
T⊇S∪{v}
PI(S, T ) · (|T | − 1)
=
∑
T⊇S
PI(S, T ) · |T | −
∑
T⊇S∪{v}
PI(S, T )
= σI(S)− Pr(v ∈ II(S)).
Lemma 5. For any two sink nodes u and v in I:
σI\{v}(S ∪ {u})− σI\{v}(S) = σI(S ∪ {u})− σI(S).
Proof. By Lemmas 4 and 2 (b), we have
σI\{v}(S ∪ {u})− σI\{v}(S)
= σI(S ∪ {u})− Pr(v ∈ II(S ∪ {u}))
− (σI(S)− Pr(v ∈ II(S)))
= σI(S ∪ {u})− Pr(v ∈ II(S))− (σI(S)− Pr(v ∈ II(S)))
= σI(S ∪ {u})− σI(S).
Soundness
Lemma 6. The Shapley centrality satisfies all Axioms 1-
5.
Proof. Axioms 1, 2, and 4 are trivially satisfied by
ψShapley, or are direct implications from the original Shapley
axiom set.
Next, we show that ψShapley satisfies Axiom 3, the Axiom
of Independence of Sink Nodes. Let u and v be two sink
nodes. Let pi be a random permutation on V . Let pi′ be the
random permutation on V \{v} derived from pi by removing
v from the random order. Let {u ≺pi v} be the event that
u is ordered before v in the permutation pi. Then we have
ψShapleyu (I) = Epi[σI(Spi,u ∪ {u})− σI(Spi,u)]
= Pr(u ≺pi v)Epi[σI(Spi,u ∪ {u})− σI(Spi,u) | u ≺pi v]+
Pr(v ≺pi u)Epi[σI(Spi,u ∪ {u})− σI(Spi,u) | v ≺pi u]
= Pr(u ≺pi v)Epi′ [σI(Spi′,u ∪ {u})− σI(Spi′,u)]+
Pr(v ≺pi u)Epi[σI(Spi,u ∪ {u})− σI(Spi,u) | v ≺pi u]
= Pr(u ≺pi v)Epi′ [σI(Spi′,u ∪ {u})− σI(Spi′,u)]+
Pr(v ≺pi u)·
Epi[σI(Spi,u \ {v} ∪ {u})− σI(Spi,u \ {v}) | v ≺pi u] (6)
= Pr(u ≺pi v)Epi′ [σI(Spi′,u ∪ {u})− σI(Spi′,u)]+
Pr(v ≺pi u)Epi′ [σI(Spi′,u ∪ {u})− σI(Spi′,u)]
= Epi′ [σI(Spi′,u ∪ {u})− σI(Spi′,u)]
= Epi′ [σI\{v}(Spi′,u ∪ {u})− σI\{v}(Spi′,u)] (7)
= ψShapleyu (I \ {v}).
Eq.(6) above uses Lemma 3, while Eq.(7) uses Lemma 5.
Finally, we show that ψShapley satisfies Axiom 5, the Criti-
cal Set Axiom. By the definition of the critical set instance,
we know that if influence instance I has critical set R, then
σI(S) = |V | if S ⊇ R, and σI(S) = |S| if S 6⊇ R. Then
for v 6∈ R, for any S ⊆ V \ {v}, σI(S ∪ {v})− σI(S) = 0 if
S ⊇ R, and σI(S ∪ {v}) − σI(S) = 1 if S 6⊇ R. For a ran-
dom permutation pi, the event R ⊆ Spi,v is the event that all
nodes in R are ordered before v in pi, which has probability
1/(|R|+ 1). Then we have that for v 6∈ R,
ψShapleyv (I) = Epi[σI(Spi,v ∪ {v})− σI(Spi,v)]
= Pr(R ⊆ Spi,v)Epi[σI(Spi,v ∪ {v})− σI(Spi,v) | R ⊆ Spi,v]+
Pr(R 6⊆ Spi,v)Epi[σI(Spi,v ∪ {v})− σI(Spi,v) | R 6⊆ Spi,v]
= Pr(R 6⊆ Spi,v) = |R||R|+ 1 .
Therefore, Shapley centrality ψShapley is a solution consistent
with Axioms 1-5.
Completeness (or Uniqueness)
We now prove the uniqueness of axiom set A. Fix a set V .
For any R,U ⊆ V with R 6= ∅ and R ⊆ U , we define the
critical set instance IR,U , an extension to the critical set
instance IR,v defined for Axiom 5.
Definition 2 (General Critical Set Instances).
For any R,U ⊆ V with R 6= ∅ and R ⊆ U , the critical set
instance IR,U = (V,E, PIR,U ) is the following influence
instance: (1) The network G = (V,E) contains a complete
directed bipartite sub-graph from R to U \ R, together with
isolated nodes V \U . (2) For all S ⊇ R, PIR,U (S,U∪S) = 1,
and (3) For all S 6⊇ R, PIR,U (S, S) = 1. For this instance,
R is called the critical set, and U is called the target set.
Intuitively, in the critical set instance IR,U , once the seed
set contains the critical setR, it guarantees to activate target
set U together with other nodes in S; but as long as some
nodes in R is not included in the seed set S, only nodes
in S can be activated. These critical set instances play an
important role in the uniqueness proof. Thus, we first study
their properties.
To study the properties of the critical set instances, it
is helpful for us to introduce a special type of sink nodes
called isolated nodes. We say v ∈ V is an isolated node
in I = (V,E, PI), if ∀S, T ⊆ V \ {v} with S ⊆ T ,
PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = PI(S, T ). In the extreme case,
PI({v}, {v}) = PI(∅, ∅) = 1, meaning that v only acti-
vates itself, No seed set can influence v unless it contains
v: For any S, T ⊆ V \ {v} with S ⊆ T , PI(S, T ∪ {v}) ≤
1−∑T ′⊇S,T ′⊆V \{v} PI(S, T ′) = 1−∑T ′⊇S,T ′⊆V \{v} PI(S∪
{v}, T ′ ∪ {v}) = 0. The role of v in any seed set is just to
activate itself: The probability of activating other nodes is
unchanged if v is removed from the seed set. It is easy to
see that by definition an isolated node is a sink node.
Lemma 7 (Sinks and Isolated Nodes). In the criti-
cal set instance IR,U , every node in V \ U is an isolated
node, and every node in V \R is a sink node.
Proof. We first prove that every node v ∈ V \ U is an
isolated node. Consider any two subsets S, T ⊆ V \ {v}
with S ⊆ T . We first analyze the case when S ⊇ R. By
Definition 2, PI(S∪{v}, T∪{v}) = 1 iff T∪{v} = U∪S∪{v},
which is equivalent to T = U ∪ S since v 6∈ U . This implies
that PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = PI(S, T ). We now analyze the
case when S 6⊇ R. By Definition 2, PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) =
1 iff T ∪ {v} = S ∪ {v}, which is equivalent to T = S.
This again implies that PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = PI(S, T ).
Therefore, v is an isolated node.
Next we show that every node v 6∈ R is a sink node. Con-
sider any two subsets S, T ⊆ T \{v} with S ⊆ T . In the case
when S ⊇ R, PI(S∪{v}, T∪{v}) = 1 iff T∪{v} = U∪S∪{v},
which is equivalent to T = U ∪ S \ {v}. Depending on
whether v ∈ U , T = U ∪ S \ {v} is equivalent to exactly
one of T = U ∪ S or T ∪ {v} = U ∪ S being true. This im-
plies that PI(S ∪{v}, T ∪{v}) = PI(S, T ) +PI(S, T ∪{v}).
In the case when S 6⊇ R, PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = 1 iff
T ∪ {v} = S ∪ {v}, which is equivalent to T = S. This also
implies that PI(S∪{v}, T ∪{v} = PI(S, T )+PI(S, T ∪{v}).
Therefore, v is a sink node by definition.
Lemma 8 (Projection). In the critical set instance
IR,U , for any node v ∈ V \ U , the projected influence in-
stance of IR,U on V \ {v}, IR,U \ {v}, is a critical set in-
stance with critical set R and target U , in the projected graph
G \ {v} = (V \ {v}, E \ {v}). For any node v ∈ U \ R, the
projected influence instance of IR,U on V \{v}, IR,U \{v}, is
a critical set instance with critical set R and target U \ {v},
in the projected graph G \ {v} = (V \ {v}, E \ {v}).
Proof. First let v ∈ V \ U and consider the projected
instance IR,U \ {v}. If S ⊆ V \ {v} is a subset with S ⊇ R,
then by the definition of projection and critical sets:
PIR,U\{v}(S, S ∪ U)
= PIR,U (S, S ∪ U) + PIR,U (S, S ∪ U ∪ {v})
= 1 + 0 = 1.
If S ⊆ V \ {v} is a subset with S 6⊇ R, similarly, we have:
PIR,U\{v}(S, S)
= PIR,U (S, S) + PIR,U (S, S ∪ {v}) = 1 + 0 = 1.
Thus by Definition 2, IR,U \{v} is still a critical set instance
with R as the critical set and U as the target set.
Next let v ∈ U \ R and consider the projected instance
IR,U \ {v}. If S ⊆ V \ {v} is a subset with S ⊇ R, then by
the definition of projection and critical sets:
PIR,U\{v}(S, S ∪ (U \ {v}))
= PIR,U (S, S ∪ (U \ {v})) + PIR,U (S, S ∪ (U \ {v}) ∪ {v})
= 0 + 1 = 1.
If S ⊆ V \ {v} is a subset with S 6⊇ R, similarly, we have:
PIR,U\{v}(S, S)
= PIR,U (S, S) + PIR,U (S, S ∪ {v}) = 1 + 0 = 1.
Thus by Definition 2, IR,U \{v} is still a critical set instance
with R as the critical set and U \ {v} as the target set.
Lemma 9 (Uniqueness in Critical Set Instances).
Fix a set V . Let ψ be a centrality measure that satisfies
axiom set A. For any R,U ⊆ V with R 6= ∅ and R ⊆ U ,
the centrality ψ(IR,U ) of the critical set instance IR,U must
be unique.
Proof. Consider the critical set instance IR,U . First, it
is easy to check that all nodes in R are symmetric to one
another, all nodes in U \ R are symmetric to one another,
and all nodes in V \U are symmetric to one another. Thus,
by the Anonymity Axiom (Axiom 1), all nodes in R have
the same centrality measure, say aR,U , all nodes in U \ R
have the same centrality measure, say bR,U , and all nodes in
V \ U have the same centrality measure, say cR,U . By the
Normalization Axiom (Axiom 2), we have
aR,U · |R|+ bR,U · (|U | − |R|) + cR,U · (|V | − |U |) = |V |. (8)
Second, we consider any node v ∈ V \U . By Lemma 7, v is
an isolated node, which is also a sink node. By Lemma 8, we
can iteratively remove all sink nodes in U \R, which would
not change the centrality measure of v by the Independence
of Sink Nodes Axiom (Axiom 3). Moreover, after removing
all nodes in U \ R, the projected instance I′ is on set R ∪
(V \U), with R as both the critical set and the target set. In
this projected instance I′, it is straightforward to check that
for every S ⊆ R∪ (V \U), PI′(S, S) = 1, which implies that
every node in R ∪ (V \U) is an isolated node. Then we can
apply the Anonymity Axiom to know that every node in I′
has the same centrality, and together with the Normalization
Axiom, we know that every node in I′ has centrality 1. Since
by the Independence of Sink Nodes Axiom removing nodes
in U \ R does not change the centrality of nodes in V \ U ,
we know that cR,U = 1.
Third, if U = R, then we do not have parameter bR,U and
aR,U is determined by Eq. (8). If U 6= R, then by Lemma 7,
any node v ∈ V \ R is a sink node. Then we can apply the
Sink Node Axiom (Axiom 3) to iteratively remove all nodes
in V \ (R ∪ {v}) (which are all sink nodes), such that the
centrality measure of v does not change after the removal.
By Lemma 8, the remaining instance with node set R∪ {v}
is still a critical set instance with critical set R and target
set R ∪ {v}. Thus we can apply the Critical Set Axiom
(Axiom 5) to this remaining influence instance, and know
that the centrality measure of v is |R|/(|R| + 1), that is,
bR,U = |R|/(|R| + 1). Therefore, aR,U is also uniquely de-
termined, which means that the centrality measure ψ(IR,U )
for instance IR,U is unique, for every nonempty subset R
and its superset U .
The influence probability profile, (PI(S, T ))S⊆T⊆V , of
each social-influence instance I can be viewed as a high-
dimensional vector. Note that in the boundary cases: (1)
when S = ∅, we have PI(S, T ) = 1 iff T = ∅; and (2) when
S = V , PI(S, T ) = 1 iff T = V . Thus, the influence-profile
vector does not need to include S = ∅ and S = V . Moreover,
for any S,
∑
T⊇S PI(S, T ) = 1. Thus, we can omit the entry
associated with one T ⊇ S from influence-profile vector. In
our proof, we canonically remove the entry associated with
T = S from the vector. With a bit of overloading on the no-
tation, we also use PI to denote this influence-profile vector
for I, and thus PI(S, T ) is the value of the specific dimension
of the vector corresponding to S, T . We let M denote the di-
mension of space of the influence-profile vectors. M is equal
to the number of pairs (S, T ) satisfying (1) S ⊂ T ⊆ V , and
(2) S 6∈ {∅, V }. S ⊂ T means S ⊆ T but S 6= T . We stress
that when we use PI as a vector and use linear combinations
of such vectors, the vectors have no dimension corresponding
to (S, T ) with S ∈ {∅, V } or S = T .
For each R and U withR ⊂ U andR 6∈ {∅, V }, we consider
the critical set instance IR,U and its corresponding vector
PIR,U . Let V be the set of these vectors.
Lemma 10 (Linear Independence). Vectors in V are
linearly independent in the space RM .
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that vectors in V
are not linearly independent. Then for each such R and U ,
we have a number αR,U ∈ R, such that∑R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U αR,U ·
PIR,U = ~0, and at least some αR,U 6= 0. Let S be the
smallest set with αS,U 6= 0 for some U ⊃ S, and let T be
any superset of S with αS,T 6= 0. By the critical set instance
definition, we have PIS,T (S, T ) = 1. Also since the vector
does not contain any dimension corresponding to PI(S, S),
we know that T ⊃ S. Then by the minimality of S, we have
0 =
∑
R,U :R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
αR,U · PIR,U (S, T )
= αS,T · PIS,T (S, T ) +
∑
U :U⊃S,U 6=T
αS,U · PIS,U (S, T )+∑
R,U :|R|≥|S|,R 6=S,U⊃R
αR,U · PIR,U (S, T )
= αS,T +
∑
U :U⊃S,U 6=T
αS,U · PIS,U (S, T )+∑
R,U :|R|≥|S|,R 6=S,U⊃R
αR,U · PIR,U (S, T ). (9)
For the third term in Eq.(9), consider any set R with |R| ≥
|S| and R 6= S. We have that S 6⊇ R, and thus by the critical
set instance definition, for any U ⊃ R, PIR,U (S, S) = 1.
Since T ⊃ S, we have T 6= S, and thus PIR,U (S, T ) = 0.
This means that the third term in Eq.(9) is 0.
For the second term in Eq.(9), consider any U ⊃ S with
U 6= T . By the critical set instance definition, we have
PIS,U (S,U) = 1 (since S is the critical set and U is the
target set). Then PIS,U (S, T ) = 0 since T 6= U . This means
that the second term in Eq.(9) is also 0.
Then we conclude that αS,T = 0, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, vectors in V are linearly independent.
The following basic lemma is useful for our uniqueness
proof.
Lemma 11. Let ψ be a mapping from a convex set D ⊆
RM to Rn satisfying that for any vectors ~v1, ~v2, . . . , ~vs ∈ D,
for any α1, α2, . . . , αs ≥ 0 and ∑si=1 αi = 1, ψ(∑si=1 αi ·
~vi) =
∑s
i=1 αi · ψ(~vi). Suppose that D contains a set of lin-
early independent basis vectors of RM , {~b1,~b2, . . . ,~bM} and
also vector ~0. Then for any ~v ∈ D, which can be represented
as ~v =
∑M
i=1 λi ·~bi for some λ1, λ2, . . . , λM ∈ R, we have
ψ(~v) = ψ
(
M∑
i=1
λi ·~bi
)
=
M∑
i=1
λi ·ψ(~bi)+
(
1−
M∑
i=1
λi
)
·ψ(~0).
Proof. We consider the convex hull formed by
{~b1,~b2, . . . ,~bM} together with ~0. Let ~v(0) = 1M+1 (
∑M
i=1
~bi +
~0), which is an interior point in the convex hull. For any
~v ∈ D, since {~b1,~b2, . . . ,~bM} is a set of basis, we have
~v =
∑M
i=1 λi · ~bi for some λ1, λ2, . . . , λM ∈ R. Let ~v(1) =
ρ~v(0) + (1 − ρ)~v with ρ ∈ (0, 1) be a convex combination of
~v(0) and ~v. Then we have ψ(~v(1)) = ρψ(~v(0)) + (1− ρ)ψ(~v),
or equivalently
ψ(~v) =
1
1− ρψ(~v
(1))− ρ
1− ρψ(~v
(0)). (10)
We select a ρ close enough to 1 such that for all i ∈ [M ],
ρ
M+1
+ (1− ρ)λi ≥ 0, and ρM+1 + (1− ρ)(1−
∑M
i=1 λi) ≥ 0.
Then ~v(1) =
∑M
i=1(
ρ
M+1
+ (1− ρ)λi)~bi + ( ρM+1 + (1− ρ)(1−∑M
i=1 λi))
~0 is in the convex hull of {~b1,~b2, . . . ,~bM ,~0}. Then
from Eq.(10), we have
ψ(~v) =ψ
(
M∑
i=1
λi ·~bi
)
=
1
1− ρψ
(
M∑
i=1
(
ρ
M + 1
+ (1− ρ)λi
)
~bi+(
ρ
M + 1
+ (1− ρ)
(
1−
M∑
i=1
λi
))
~0
)
−
ρ
1− ρψ
(
1
M + 1
(
M∑
i=1
~bi +~0
))
=
1
1− ρ
(
M∑
i=1
(
ρ
M + 1
+ (1− ρ)λi
)
ψ(~bi)+(
ρ
M + 1
+ (1− ρ)
(
1−
M∑
i=1
λi
))
ψ(~0)
)
−
ρ
1− ρ
(
1
M + 1
(
M∑
i=1
ψ(~bi) + ψ(~0)
))
=
M∑
i=1
λiψ(~bi) +
(
1−
M∑
i=1
λi
)
· ψ(~0).
Lemma 12 (Completeness). The centrality measure
satisfying axiom set A is unique.
Proof. Let ψ be a centrality measure that satisfies axiom
set A.
Fix a set V . Let the null influence instance IN to be the
instance in which no seed set has any influence except to it-
self, that is, For any S ⊆ V , PIN (S, S) = 1. It is straightfor-
ward to check that every node is an isolated node in the null
instance, and thus by the Anonymity Axiom (Axiom 1) and
the Normalization Axiom (Axiom 2), we have ψv(IN ) = 1
for all v ∈ V . That is, ψv(IN ) is uniquely determined. Note
that, by our canonical convention of influence-profile vector
space, PIN (S, S) is not in the vector representation of PIN .
Thus vector PIN is the all-0 vector in RM . By Lemma 10,
we know that V is a set of basis for RM . Then for any
influence instance I,
PI =
∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
λR,U · PIR,U ,
where parameters λR,U ∈ R. Because of the Bayesian Influ-
ence Axiom (Axiom 4), and the fact that the all-0 vector in
RM is the influence instance IN , we can apply Lemma 11
and obtain:
ψ(PI) =
∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
λR,U · ψ(PIR,U )
+
1− ∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
λR,U
ψ(PIN ), (11)
where the notation ψ(PI) is the same as ψ(I). By Lemma 9
we know that all ψ(PIR,U )’s are uniquely determined. By
the argument above, we also know that ψ(PIN ) is uniquely
determined. Therefore, ψ(PI) must be unique.
Independence
An axiom is independent if it cannot be implied by other
axioms in the axiom set. Thus, if an axiom is not inde-
pendent, the centrality measure satisfying the rest axioms
should still be unique by Lemma 12. Therefore, to show the
independence of an axiom, it is sufficient to show that there
is a centrality measure different from the Shapley centrality
that satisfies the rest axioms. We will show the indepen-
dence of each axiom in A in the next series of lemmas.
Lemma 13. The Anonymity Axiom (Axiom 1) is inde-
pendent.
Proof. We consider a centrality measure ψ(1) defined as
follows. Let Π′ be a nonuniform distribution on all permu-
tations over set V , such that for any node v ∈ V , the prob-
ability that v is ordered at the last position in a random
permutation pi drawn from Π′ is 1/|V |, but the probabilities
of v in other positions may not be uniform. Such a nonuni-
form distribution can be achieved by uniformly pick v ∈ V
and put v in the last position, and then apply an arbitrary
nonuniform distribution for the rest |V | − 1 positions. We
then define ψ(1) as:
ψ(1)v (I) = Epi∼Π′ [σI(Spi,v ∪ {v})− σI(Spi,v)].
Since Π′ is nonuniform, the above defined ψ(1) is not Shapley
centrality, although it has the same form.
We now verify that ψ(1) satisfies Axioms 2–5. Actually,
since ψ(1) follows the same form as ψShapley, one can easily
check that it also satisfies Axioms 2, 3 and 4. In particular,
for Axiom 3, one can check the proof of Lemma 6 and see
that the proof for Shapley centrality satisfying Axiom 3 does
not rely on whether random permutation pi is drawn from a
uniform or nonuniform distribution of permutations. Thus
the same proof works for the current ψ(1). For Axiom 5,
following the same proof as in the proof of Lemma 6, we
have ψ
(1)
v (IR,v) = Prpi∼Π′(R 6⊆ Spi,v) = 1 − Prpi∼Π′(R =
Spi,v). As we know, for distribution Π
′, node v appearing
as the last node in a random permutation pi drawn from Π′
is 1/|V | = 1/(|R| + 1), which is exactly Prpi∼Π′(R = Spi,v).
Therefore, we have ψ
(1)
v (IR,v) = |R|/(|R|+1). Axiom 5 also
holds.
As a remark, the Anonymity Axiom 1 does not hold for
ψ(1): Consider the influence instance I where every subset
deterministically influences all nodes. In this case, for any
permutation pi, pi(I) is the same as I, because every node
is symmetric. Axiom 1 says in this case all nodes should
have the same centrality. Notice that by our definition of
ψ(1), ψ
(1)
v is exactly |V | times the probability of v being
ranked first in a random permutation pi drawn from Π′.
But since Π′ is nonuniform, some node u would have higher
probability to be ranked first than some other node v, and
thus ψ
(1)
u (I) > ψ(1)v (I), and Axiom 1 does not hold.
Lemma 14. The Normalization Axiom (Axiom 2) is in-
dependent.
Proof. For this axiom, we define ψ(2) first on the critical
set instances in V, and then use their linear independence
to define ψ(2) on all instances.
For every instance IR,U ∈ V, we define
ψ(2)v (IR,U ) =

a|R|,|U|,|V | v ∈ R,
|R|
|R|+1 v ∈ U \R,
c v ∈ V \ U.
(12)
We can show that by Axioms 1, 3 and 5, the above centrality
assignments are the only possible assignments. In fact, for
every v ∈ V \U , we can repeatedly apply Axiom 3 to remove
nodes in U \R first, and then remove all but v to get a single
node instance, which must have one centrality value, and we
denote it c. For every v ∈ U \R, we apply Axiom 3 again to
remove all nodes in V \ (R ∪ {v}). and then apply Axiom 5
to show that v must have centrality |R|/(|R|+ 1). For every
node v ∈ R, by Anonymity Axiom, they must have the same
centrality within the same instance IR,U , and then further
apply Anonymity Axiom between two instances with the
same size of |V |, |R| and |U |, we know that they all have
the same value, and thus we can use a|R|,|U|,|V | to denote it.
Thus, for a fixed |V |, totally the degree of freedom for ψ(2)
is (|V | − 2)(|V | − 1)/2 + 1.
For the null instance IN defined in the proof of Lemma 12
(where every node is an isolated node), applying Axiom 3
repeatedly we know that the centrality of every node in IN
must be c.
For an arbitrary instance I, by Lemma 10 we have
PI =
∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
λIR,U · PIR,U , (13)
where λIR,U ∈ R. Now we define ψ(2)(I) as
ψ(2)(I) =
∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
λIR,U · ψ(2)(IR,U )
+
1− ∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
λIR,U
ψ(2)(IN ). (14)
It is obvious that the definition of ψ(2) does not depend
on node labeling, and thus it satisfies Axiom 1. Since
ψ
(2)
v (IR,v) = |R|/(|R| + 1), it satisfies Axiom 5. Since all
construction is linear, it is not hard to see that it satisfies
Axiom 4, and we provide the complete derivation below.
For any Bayesian instance IB({Iη},λ), by definition we have
PIB({Iη},λ)(S, T ) =
∑r
η=1 ληPIη (S, T ). Note that here λη’s
and λIR,U ’s are different sets of parameters. Thus we have
PIB({Iη},λ) =
r∑
η=1
ληPIη
=
r∑
η=1
λη
∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
λI
η
R,U · PIR,U
=
∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
(
r∑
η=1
ληλ
Iη
R,U
)
· PIR,U .
Then by Eq. (14),
ψ(2)(IB({Iη},λ)) =
∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
r∑
η=1
ληλ
Iη
R,U · ψ(2)(IR,U )
+
1− ∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
r∑
η=1
ληλ
Iη
R,U
ψ(2)(IN )
=
r∑
η=1
λη ·
 ∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
λI
η
R,U · ψ(2)(IR,U )
+
1− ∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
λI
η
R,U
ψ(2)(IN )

=
r∑
η=1
ληψ
(2)(Iη),
where the second equality uses the fact that
∑r
η=1 λη = 1.
Therefore, the Bayesian Axiom (Axiom 4) holds.
Finally, we verify that the Independence of Sink Node Ax-
iom (Axiom 3) holds. Suppose u and v are two sink nodes of
an instance I = (V,E, PI). Since we need to work on pro-
jection, we clarify the notation and use IVR,U and IV,N to
represent the critical instance and the null instance, respec-
tively, in set V . By the definition of projection and Eq. (13),
we have for any ∅ ⊂ S ⊂ T ⊆ V \ {v},
PI\{v}(S, T ) = PI(S, T ) + PI(S, T ∪ {v})
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V
λIR,U ·
(
PIV
R,U
(S, T ) + PIV
R,U
(S, T ∪ {v})
)
.
(15)
For v ∈ R, by the definition of IVR,U , we know that for
S ⊂ T ⊆ V \ {v}, PIV
R,U
(S, T ) = PIV
R,U
(S, T ∪ {v}) =
0. For v 6∈ R, v is a sink node in IVR,U , and thus
PIV
R,U
(S, T ) + PIV
R,U
(S, T ∪ {v}) = PIV
R,U
\{v}(S, T ). From
Lemma 8, we know that the projection IVR,U \ {v} = IV \{v}R,U
when v ∈ V \U , and IVR,U \{v} = IV \{v}R,U\{v} when if v ∈ U \R.
In particular, if U = R ∪ {v}, then IV \{v}R,U\{v} is the null in-
stance where every node is an isolated node, in which case
PIV \{v}
R,U\{v}
(S, T ) = 0 for any S ⊂ T . Combining the above,
we continue Eq. (15) to have
PI\{v}(S, T )
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,v 6∈U
λIR,U · PIV \{v}
R,U
(S, T )+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,v∈U\R
λIR,U · PIV \{v}
R,U\{v}
(S, T )
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v}
λIR,U · PIV \{v}
R,U
(S, T )+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v}
λIR,U∪{v} · PIV \{v}
R,U
(S, T )
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v}
(
λIR,U + λ
I
R,U∪{v}
)
· PIV \{v}
R,U
(S, T ).
Since PI\{v} has unique linear representation from
PIV \{v}
R,U
’s, for all ∅ ⊂ R ⊂ U ⊆ V \ {v} we have
λ
I\{v}
R,U = λ
I
R,U + λ
I
R,U∪{v}. (16)
We now derive the relation between ψ
(2)
u (I \ {v}) and
ψ
(2)
u (I). By Eqs. (12), (14) and (16),
ψ(2)u (I \ {v}) =
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v}
λ
I\{v}
R,U ψ
(2)
u (IV \{v}R,U )
+
1− ∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v}
λ
I\{v}
R,U
ψ(2)u (IV \{v},N )
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v},u 6∈U
(
λIR,U + λ
I
R,U∪{v}
)
· c
+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v},u∈U\R
(
λIR,U + λ
I
R,U∪{v}
)
· |R||R|+ 1
+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v},u∈R
(
λIR,U + λ
I
R,U∪{v}
)
· a|R|,|U|,|V |−1
+
1− ∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v}
(
λIR,U + λ
I
R,U∪{v}
) · c
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v},u∈U\R
(
λIR,U + λ
I
R,U∪{v}
)
· |R||R|+ 1
+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v},u∈R
(
λIR,U + λ
I
R,U∪{v}
)
· a|R|,|U|,|V |−1
+
1− ∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v},u∈U
(
λIR,U + λ
I
R,U∪{v}
) · c (17)
Note that
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v},u∈U
(
λIR,U + λ
I
R,U∪{v}
)
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U,v 6∈U
λIR,U +
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U,v∈U\R
λIR,U
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U,v 6∈R
λIR,U .
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v},u∈U\R
(
λIR,U + λ
I
R,U∪{v}
)
· |R||R|+ 1
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U\R,v 6∈U
λIR,U · |R||R|+ 1
+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U\R,v∈U\R
λIR,U · |R||R|+ 1
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U\R,v 6∈R
λIR,U · |R||R|+ 1 .
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V \{v},u∈R
(
λIR,U + λ
I
R,U∪{v}
)
· a|R|,|U|,|V |−1
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈R,v 6∈U
λIR,U · a|R|,|U|,|V |−1
+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈R,v∈U\R
λIR,U · a|R|,|U|−1,|V |−1
Plugging the above three results into Eq. (17), we have
ψ(2)u (I \ {v}) =
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U\R,v 6∈R
λIR,U · |R||R|+ 1
+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈R,v 6∈U
λIR,U · a|R|,|U|,|V |−1
+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈R,v∈U\R
λIR,U · a|R|,|U|−1,|V |−1
+
1− ∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U,v 6∈R
λIR,U
 · c (18)
Similarly, we expand ψ
(2)
u (I):
ψ(2)u (I) =
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V
λIR,Uψ
(2)
u (IVR,U )
+
1− ∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V
λIR,U
ψ(2)u (IV,N )
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u6∈U
λIR,U · c+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U\R
λIR,U · |R||R|+ 1
+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈R
λIR,U · a|R|,|U|,|V | +
1− ∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V
λIR,U
 · c
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U\R
λIR,U · |R||R|+ 1
+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈R
λIR,U · a|R|,|U|,|V |
+
1− ∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U
λIR,U
 · c (19)
Subtracing Eq. (18) from Eq. (19), we have
ψ(2)u (I)− ψ(2)u (I \ {v}) =
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U\R,v∈R
λIR,U · |R||R|+ 1
+
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈R
λIR,U · a|R|,|U|,|V |
−
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈R,v 6∈U
λIR,U · a|R|,|U|,|V |−1
−
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈R,v∈U\R
λIR,U · a|R|,|U|−1,|V |−1
−
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,u∈U,v∈R
λIR,U · c. (20)
We want the above difference to be zero, but so far we
have not used the property that both u and v are sink nodes
in I yet, except that the project I \ {v} is defined when
v is a sink node. Next, suppose that v is a sink node in
I and we would derive some properties on λIR,U based on
this fact. By the definition of sink nodes, we have for all
∅ ⊆ S ⊂ T ⊆ V \ {v},∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V
λIR,UPIV
R,U
(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v})
= PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v})
= PI(S, T ) + PI(S, T ∪ {v})
=
∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V
λIR,U
(
PIV
R,U
(S, T ) + PIV
R,U
(S, T ∪ {v})
)
.
Note that when v 6∈ R, v is a sink node in IVR,U , and so we
have PIV
R,U
(S, T ) + PIV
R,U
(S, T ∪ {v}) = PIV
R,U
(S ∪ {v}, T ∪
{v}). When v ∈ R, since v 6∈ S and S ⊂ T , we have
PIV
R,U
(S, T )+PIV
R,U
(S, T ∪{v}) = 0. Thus the above implies
that ∑
∅⊂R⊂U⊆V,v∈R
λIR,UPIV
R,U
(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = 0.
Note that if R 6⊆ S ∪ {v}, then PIV
R,U
(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = 0.
When R ⊆ S ∪ {v}, PIV
R,U
(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = 1 if and only
if T ∪ {v} = S ∪ {v} ∪ U ; otherwise it is 0. Thus the above
is equivalent to ∑
R,U :∅⊂R⊂U,v∈R,R⊆S∪{v},T∪{v}=S∪{v}∪U
λIR,U = 0. (21)
Set S = ∅ first. Then R must be {v}. For any T such
that S ⊂ T ⊆ V \ {v}, we see that U must be T ∪ {v} to
satisfy the constraint in the above summation. Thus we have
λI{v},U = 0 for any {v} ⊂ U ⊆ V . Now, let |S| = 1. In this
case R = {v} or R = S ∪ {v}. We already know from above
that if R = {v}, λI{v},U = 0. Thus in Eq. (21), what are left
are the terms with R = S ∪{v}. When R = S ∪{v}, we can
see that U must be T ∪ {v}. Then we obtain that λIR,U = 0
for every |R| = 2, v ∈ R, and R ⊂ U ⊆ V . Repeating the
above argument for |R| = 3, 4, . . . (or |S| = 2, 3, . . . ,), we
eventually conclude that for every R and U such that v ∈ R
and R ⊂ U ⊆ V , λIR,U = 0.
With the above important property, we look back at
Eq. (20). Notice that in all the five summation terms, we
have either v ∈ R or u ∈ R, and both u and v are sink
nodes. Therefore, all these five summation terms are 0, and
finally we conclude that ψ
(2)
u (I) = ψ(2)u (I \ {v}) for an ar-
bitrary instance I. This means that the Independence of
Sink Nodes Axiom (Axiom 3) always holds for the definition
of ψ(2) (Eq. (12)) with any possible parameters a|R|,|U|,|V |’s
and c. Hence, we have many degree of freedom to chose these
parameters other than the ones determined by the Shapley
centrality, and thus the Normalization Axiom (Axiom 2) is
independent.
Lemma 15. The Independence of Sink Nodes Axiom (Ax-
iom 3) is independent.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 14, we first define
ψ(3) on critical set instances in V, and then use their linear
independence to extend the definition to all instances.
For every instance IR,U ∈ V, we know that R ⊂ U and
R 6∈ {∅, V }. When |R| = |V | − 1, we define ψ(3)v (IR,U ) =
|R|/(|R| + 1) for the unique v ∈ V \ R, and ψ(3)u (IR,U ) =
(|V |−|R|/(|R|+1))/|R| for every u ∈ R. When |R| 6= |V |−1,
we simply define ψ
(3)
v (IR,U ) = 1 for all v ∈ V . It is straight-
forward to see that for every IR,U ∈ V, ψ(3) is anonymous
(not depend on the label of a node), and normalized (cen-
trality summed up to |V |), and for the critical set instance
IR,v, it satisfies the requirement of Axiom 5. For the null
instance IN defined in the proof of Lemma 12, we define
ψ
(3)
v (IN ) = 1 for every v ∈ V . Thus for IN ψ(3) is also
anonymous and normalized.
Now for an arbitrary influence instance I, by Lemma 10
we have
PI =
∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
λIR,U · PIR,U ,
where λIR,U ∈ R. Then we define ψ(3)(I) below patterned
by Eq. (11):
ψ(3)(I) =
∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
λIR,U · ψ(3)(IR,U )
+
1− ∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
λIR,U
ψ(3)(IN ). (22)
It is straightforward to verify that when all IR,U ∈ V and
IN are anonymous and normalized, I is also anonymous and
normalized, and thus ψ(3) satisfies Axioms 1 and 2. More-
over, ψ(3) also satisfies the Bayesian Axiom (Axiom 4), with
the same proof as the one in the proof of Lemma 14. By
its definition, we already know that ψ(3) satisfies Axiom 5.
Obviously, ψ(3) is different from ψShapley and it does not
satisfies the Independence of Sink Nodes Axiom (Axiom 3).
Hence, Axiom 3 is independent.
Lemma 16. The Bayesian Axiom (Axiom 4) is indepen-
dent.
Proof. We define a centrality measure ψ(4) as follows.
Given an influence instance I = (V,E, PI), for every sink
node v in I, if there is a set R ⊆ V \ {v}, such that∑
T :R∪{v}⊆T PI(R, T ) = 1, we let Rv be the smallest such
set (tie is broken with some arbitrary deterministic rule);
if such R does not exists, then we let Rv = ∅. Intu-
itively, Rv is the smallest set that can influence v with
probability 1. Then, for every sink node v, we define
ψ
(4)
v (I) = |Rv|/(|Rv| + 1); for non-sink nodes, we let them
equally devide the rest share so that the total centrality is
|V |.
The definition of ψ(4) does not depend on node labeling, so
Axiom 1 is clearly satisfied. The definition enforces that the
sum of all centralities is |V |, so Axiom 2 is satisfied. For the
critical set infance IR,v, v is a sink node, and by definition
R is the smallest one such that PIR,v (R,R∪{v}) = 1, so by
the definition of ψ(4), we have ψ
(4)
v (IR,v) = |R|/(|R| + 1),
thus satisfying Axiom 5.
For the Independence of Sink Nodes Axiom (Axiom 3),
consider an influence instance I and its two sink nodes u and
v. We claim that the projection I \ {v} does not change set
Ru. In fact, suppose first that in I there is a set R ⊆ V \{u}∑
T :R∪{u}⊆T PI(R, T ) = 1. If v 6∈ R, then by the definition
of projection,∑
T :R∪{u}⊆T⊆V \{v}
PI\{v}(R, T )
=
∑
T :R∪{u}⊆T⊆V \{v}
PI(R, T ) + PI(R, T ∪ {v})
=
∑
T :R∪{u}⊆T⊆V
PI(R, T ) = 1.
Thus R is still a set in I \ {v} that influence v with proba-
bility 1. If v ∈ R, since v is a sink node, we have∑
T :R\{v}∪{u}⊆T⊆V
PI(R \ {v}, T )
=
∑
T :R∪{u}⊆T⊆V
PI(R \ {v}, T \ {v}) + PI(R \ {v}, T )
=
∑
T :R∪{u}⊆T⊆V
PI(R, T ) = 1,
where the second to last equality is by the definition of sink
node. Thus, the above equation implies that R \ {v} is a
smaller set that influences u with probability 1. The cases
of v ∈ R and v 6∈ R together imply that Ru for instance I
still works for instance I \ {v}.
Conversely, suppose R is a set influencing u with proba-
bility 1 in I \ {v}. Then we have∑
T :R∪{u}⊆T⊆V
PI(R, T )
=
∑
T :R∪{u}⊆T⊆V \{v}
PI(R, T ) + PI(R, T ∪ {v})
=
∑
T :R∪{u}⊆T⊆V \{v}
PI\{v}(R, T ) = 1.
Therefore, R is still a set influencing u with probability 1 in
I.
Hence, from the above argument from both sides, we know
that, either there does not exists a set R that influences u
with probability 1 in I or I \ {v}, or the smallest such sets
in I and I \{v} are the same. Therefore, we have ψ(4)u (I) =
ψ
(4)
u (I \ {v}) = |Rv|/(|Rv| + 1), where Rv is the smallest
such set or ∅. This means, ψ(4) satisfies the Independence of
Sink Nodes Axiom (Axiom 3). Since ψ(4) is clearly different
from ψShapley, we know that Axiom 3 is independent.
Lemma 17. The Bargaining with Critical Sets Axiom
(Axiom 5) is independent.
Proof. We construct ψ(5) by trivially assigning every
node with centrality 1. It is obvious that this constant ψ(5)
satisfies Axioms 1–4, and it is different from ψShapley. Thus
Axiom 5 is independent.
Lemmas 13–17 together implies the following:
Lemma 18 (Independence). All axioms in the axiom
set A are independent.
Proof of Theorem 1. The theorem is proved by com-
bining Lemmas 6, 12 and 18.
A.2 On Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2, the axiomatic characterization
of SNI centrality, follows the same structure as the proof
of Theorem 1. For soundness, it is easy to verify that SNI
centrality satisfies Axioms 4, 6, and 7. In particular, for the
Bayesian Influence Axiom (Axiom 4), we can verify that
σIB({Iη},λ)({v}) =
∑
T⊆V,v∈T
PIB({Iη},λ)({v}, T ) · |T |
=
∑
T⊆V,v∈T
r∑
η=1
ληPIη ({v}, T ) =
r∑
η=1
λη
∑
T⊆V,v∈T
PIη ({v}, T )
=
r∑
η=1
λησIη ({v}),
and thus Bayesian Influence Axiom also holds for SNI cen-
trality.
For completeness, since SNI centrality also satisfies the
Bayesian Influence Axiom, we following the same proof
structure as Lemma 12, which utilizes the linear mapping
lemma 11. All we need to show is that for all critical set in-
stances IR,U as well as the null instance IN , Axioms 6, and
7 dictate that their centrality measure is unique. For the
null instance, by the Uniform Sink Node Axiom (Axiom 6),
we know that all nodes have centrality value of 1. For the
critical set instance IR,U , again by the Uniform Sink Node
Axiom, we know that all nodes in V \R are sink nodes and
thus have centrality value of 1. Finally, Axiom 7 uniquely
determines the centrality value of all critical nodes in R.
Therefore, Axioms 4, 6, and 7 uniquely determines the cen-
trality measure, which is SNI centrality. This proves Theo-
rem 2.
For independence, the independence of Axiom 7 can be
shown by considering the uniform centrality measure where
every node is assigned centrality of 1. We can see that the
uniform centrality satisfies Axiom 4 and 6 but not 7. For
the independence of Axiom 6, we can see that Axiom 7 only
restricts the nodes in R in the critical set instances IR,U .
Then we can assign arbitrary values, for example 0, to nodes
not in R in IR,U , and thus obtaining a centrality measure
defined on the critical set instances that is consistent with
Axiom 7 but different from ψSNI. Next, we use the linearity
(Eq. (11)) to extend the centrality measure to arbitrary in-
stances. Bayesian Axiom (Axiom 4) holds because our way
of linear extension. Finally, for the independence of Ax-
iom 4, we notice that with Axioms 6 and 7, the centrality
for all critical set instances are uniquely determined, but we
have the freedom to define other instances, as long as the
sink nodes always have centrality of 1. This means we can
easily find a centrality measure that is different from ψSNI
but satisfies Axioms 6 and 7. Therefore, Axioms 4, 6 and 7
are all independent of one another.
B. SHAPLEY SYMMETRY OF SYMMET-
RIC IC MODELS
In this appendix section, we formally prove the Shapley
symmetry of the symmetric IC model stated in Section 3.
We restate it in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Shapley Symmetry of Symmetric IC).
In any symmetric IC model, the Shapley centrality of every
node is the same.
We first prove the following basic lemma.
Lemma 19 (Deterministic Undirected Influence).
Consider an undirected graph G = (V,E), and the IC in-
stance I on G in which for every undirected edge (u, v) ∈ E,
pu,v = pv,u = 1. Then, ψ
Shapley
v (I) = 1, ∀v ∈ V ,
Proof. Let C be the connected component containing
node v. For any fixed permutation pi of V , if some other node
u ∈ C appears before v in pi — i.e. u ∈ Spi,v — then because
all edges have influence probability 1 in both directions, u
influences every node in C. For this permutation, v has no
marginal influence: σI(Spi,v∪{v})−σI(Spi,v) = 0. If v is the
first node in C that appears in pi, then v activates every node
in C, and its marginal spread is |C|. The probability that v
appears first among all nodes in C in a random permutation
pi is exactly 1/|C|. Therefore:
ψShapleyv (I) = Epi[σI(Spi,v∪{v})−σI(Spi,v)] = 1/|C|·|C| = 1.
Proof of Theorem 5. We will use the following well-
known but important observation about symmetric IC mod-
els: We can use the following undirected live-edge graph
model to represent its influence spread. For every edge
(u, v) ∈ E, since we have pu,v = pv,u, we sample an undi-
rected edge (u, v) with success probability pu,v. The result-
ing undirected random live-edge graph is denoted as L¯. For
any seed set S, the propagation from the seed set can only
pass through each edge (u, v) at most once, either from u to
v or from v to u, but never in both directions. Therefore, we
can apply the Principle of Deferred Decision and only de-
cide the direction of the live edge (u, v) when the influence
process does need to pass the edge. Hence, the set of nodes
reachable from S in the undirected graph L¯, namely Γ(L¯, S),
is the set of activated nodes. Thus, σI(S) = EL¯[|Γ(L¯, S)|].
For each “deferred” realization L¯ of L¯, the propagation on
L¯ is the same as treating every edge in L¯ having influence
probability 1 in both directions. Then, by Lemma 19, the
Shapley centrality of every node on the fixed L¯ is the same.
Finally, by taking expectation over the distribution of L¯, we
have:
ψShapleyv (I) =Epi[σI(Spi,v ∪ {v})− σI(Spi,v)]
=Epi[EL¯[|Γ(L¯, Spi,v ∪ {v})| − |Γ(L¯, Spi,v)|]]
=EL¯[Epi[|Γ(L¯, Spi,v ∪ {v})| − |Γ(L¯, Spi,v)|]]
=EL¯[1] = 1.
C. ANALYSIS OF ASV-RR
In this appendix, we provide a complete proof of The-
orem 3, and briefly extend the discussion to the proof of
Theorem 6. In the discussion below, we will use v ∼ V to
denote that v is drawn uniformly at random from V . We
will use pi ∼ Π(V ) to denote that pi is a uniform random
permutation of V . Let I{E} be the indicator function for
event E . Let m = |E| and n = |V |.
C.1 Unbiasedness and Absolute Normaliza-
tion of the Shapley Estimator of ASV-RR
We first build connections between random RR sets and
the Shapley value computation. The following is a straight-
forward proposition to verify:
Proposition 20. Fix a subset R ⊆ V . For any v ∈ R,
Pr(R ∩ Spi,v = ∅) = 1/|R|, where pi ∼ Π(V ) and Spi,v is the
subset of nodes preceding v in pi.
Proof. The event R∩Spi,v = ∅ is equivalent to pi placing
v ahead of other nodes in R. Because pi ∼ Π(V ), this event
happens with probability exactly 1/|R|.
Proposition 21. A random RR set R is equivalently
generated by first (a) generating a random live-edge graph
L, and (b) selecting v ∼ V . Then, R is the set of nodes
that can reach v in L.
Lemma 22 (Marginal Contribution). Let R be a
random RR set. For any S ⊆ V and v ∈ V \ S:
σ(S) = n · Pr(S ∩R 6= ∅), (23)
σ(S ∪ {v})− σ(S) = n · Pr(v ∈ R ∧ S ∩R = ∅).(24)
Proof. Let L be a random live-edge graph generated by
the triggering model (see Section 2.1). Recall that Γ(L, S)
denote the set of nodes in graph L reachable from set S.
Then:
σ(S) =EL[|Γ(L, S)|]
=EL
[∑
u∈V
I{u ∈ Γ(L, S)}
]
=n · EL
[∑
u∈V
1
n
· I{u ∈ Γ(L, S)}
]
=n · EL [Eu∼V [I{u ∈ Γ(L, S)}]]
=n · Pr
L,u∼V
{u ∈ Γ(L, S)},
Note that for any function f , and random variables x,y:
Ex [Ey[f(x,y)]] = E [E[f(x,y) | x = x]] .
In other words, we can evaluate the expectation as the fol-
lowing: (1) fix the value of random variable x to x first, then
(2) take the conditional expectation of f(x,y) conditioned
upon x = x, and finally (3) take the expectation according
to x’s distribution.
By Proposition 21, event u ∈ Γ(L, S) is the same as the
event S ∩R 6= ∅. Hence we have σ(S) = n · Pr(S ∩R 6= ∅).
Similarly,
σ(S ∪ {v})− σ(S)
= EL[|Γ(L, S ∪ {v}) \ Γ(L, S)|]
= EL
[∑
u∈V
I{u ∈ Γ(L, S ∪ {v}) \ Γ(L, S)}
]
= n · EL
[∑
u∈V
1
n
· I{u ∈ Γ(L, S ∪ {v}) \ Γ(L, S)}
]
= n · EL [Eu∼V [I{u ∈ Γ(L, S ∪ {v}) \ Γ(L, S)}]]
= n · Pr
L,u∼V
{u ∈ Γ(L, S ∪ {v}) \ Γ(L, S)}.
By a similar argument, event u ∈ Γ(L, S ∪ {v}) \ Γ(L, S) is
the same as the event v ∈ R ∧ S ∩R = ∅. Hence we have
σ(S ∪ {v})− σ(S) = n · Pr(v ∈ R ∧ S ∩R = ∅).
For a fixed subset R ⊆ V and a node v ∈ V , define:
XR(v) =
{
0 if v 6∈ R;
1
|R| if v ∈ R.
If R is a random RR set, then XR(v) is a random variable.
The following is a restatement of Lemma 1 using the XR(v)
random variable.
Lemma 23 (Shapley Value Identity). Let R be a
random RR set. Then, for all v ∈ V , the Shapley centrality
of v is ψv = n · ER[XR(v)].
Proof. Let R be a random RR set. We have
ψv =Epi[σ(Spi,v ∪ {v})− σ(Spi,v)] {by Eq. (2)}
=Epi[n · Pr(v ∈ R ∧ Spi,v ∩R = ∅)] {by Lemma 22}
=n · Epi[ER[I{v ∈ R ∧ Spi,v ∩R = ∅}]]
=n · ER[Epi[I{v ∈ R ∧ Spi,v ∩R = ∅}]].
By Proposition 20, for any realization of R:
Epi∼Π(V )[I{v ∈ R ∧ Spi,v ∩R = ∅}] =
{
0 if v 6∈ R,
1
|R| if v ∈ R.
This means that Epi∼Π(V )[I{v ∈ R∧Spi,v∩R = ∅}] = XR(v).
Therefore, ψv = n · ER[XR(v)].
After the above preparation, we are ready to show the
unbiasedness of our Shapley estimator.
Lemma 24 (Unbiased Estimator). For any v ∈ V ,
the estimated value ψˆv returned by Algorithm 1 satisfies
E[ψˆv] = ψv, where the expectation is taken over all ran-
domness used in Algorithm ASV-RR.
Proof. In Phase 2 of Algorithm ASV-RR, when θ is fixed
to θ, the algorithm generates θ independent random RR sets
R1, . . . ,Rθ. Let est
θ
v be the value of estv at the end of the
for-loop in Phase 2, when θ = θ. It is straightforward to see
that estθv =
∑θ
i=1 XRi(v). Therefore, by Lemma 23:
E[ψˆv | θ = θ] = E[n · estθv/θ] = E[n ·
θ∑
i=1
XRi(v)/θ] = ψv.
Since this is true for every fixed θ, we have E[ψˆv] = ψv.
Lemma 25 (Absolute Normalization). In every
run of ASV-RR, we have
∑
v∈V ψˆv = n.
Proof. According to line 22 of the algorithm, for every
RR set R generated in Phase 2, each node u ∈ R increases
its estimate estu by 1/|R| and no other nodes increase their
estimates. Thus the total increase in the estimates of all
nodes for each R is exactly 1. Then after generating θ RR
sets, the sum of estimates is θ. According to line 24, we
conclude that
∑
v∈V ψˆv = n.
C.2 Robustness of the Shapley Estimator of
ASV-RR
The analysis on the robustness and time complexity is
similar to that of IMM in [33], but since we are working
on Shapley values while IMM is for influence maximization,
there are also a number of differences. In what follows, we
provide an indepdent and complete proof for our algorithm,
borrowing some ideas from [33].
We will use the following basic Chernoff bounds [20, 13]
in our analysis.
Fact 26 (Chernoff Bounds). Let Y be the sum of t
i.i.d. random variables with mean µ and value range [0, 1].
For any δ > 0, we have:
Pr{Y − tµ ≥ δ · tµ} ≤ exp
(
− δ
2
2 + 2
3
δ
tµ
)
.
For any 0 < δ < 1, we have
Pr{Y − tµ ≤ −δ · tµ} ≤ exp
(
−δ
2
2
tµ
)
.
Let ψ(k) be the k-th largest value among all shapley values
in {ψv}v∈V , as defined in Theorem 3. The following lemma
provides a condition for robust Shapley value estimation.
Lemma 27. At the end of Phase 2 of Algorithm ASV-RR,{ |ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εψv ∀v ∈ V with ψv > ψ(k),
|ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εψ(k) ∀v ∈ V with ψv ≤ ψ(k).
holds with probability at least 1 − 1
2n`
, provided that the re-
alization θ of θ satisfies:
θ ≥ n((`+ 1) lnn+ ln 4)(2 +
2
3
ε)
ε2ψ(k)
. (25)
Proof. Let R1,R2, . . . ,Rθ be the θ independent and
random RR sets generated in Phase 2. Let estθv be the
value of estv at the end of the for-loop in Phase 2, when
θ = θ. Then, estθv =
∑θ
i=1 XRi(v), ∀v ∈ V . By Lemma 23,
E[XRi(v)] = ψv/n.
For every v ∈ V with ψv > ψ(k), we apply the Chernoff
bounds (Fact 26) and have:
Pr{|ψˆv − ψv| ≥ εψv}
= Pr{|n · estθv/θ − ψv| ≥ εψv}
= Pr{|estθv − θ · ψv/n| ≥ ε · (θ · ψv/n)}
≤ 2 exp
(
− ε
2
2 + 2
3
ε
· θ · ψv/n
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− ε
2 · ψv
(2 + 2
3
ε) · n ·
n((`+ 1) lnn+ ln 4)(2 + 2
3
ε)
ε2ψ(k)
)
≤ 2 exp (−(`+ 1) lnn+ ln 4) {since ψv > ψ(k)}
≤ 1
2n`+1
.
For every v ∈ V with ψv ≤ ψ(k), we also apply the Chernoff
bound and have:
Pr{|ψˆv − ψv| ≥ εψ(k)}
= Pr{|n · estθv/θ − ψv| ≥ εψ(k)}
= Pr{|estθv − θ · ψv/n| ≥ (εψ(k)/ψv) · (θ · ψv/n)}
≤ 2 exp
(
− (εψ
(k)/ψv)
2
2 + 2
3
(εψ(k)/ψv)
· θ · ψv/n
)
= 2 exp
(
− ε
2(ψ(k))2
n(2ψv +
2
3
εψ(k))
· θ
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− ε
2ψ(k)
n(2 + 2
3
ε)
· θ
)
{since ψv ≤ ψ(k)}
≤ 1
2n`+1
. {use Eq. (25)}
Finally, we take the union bound among all n nodes in V to
obtain the result.
For Phase 1, we need to show that with high probability
LB ≤ ψ(k), and thus Eq.(25) hold for the random θ set
in line 17 of the algorithm. The structure of the Phase 1
of ASV-RR follows the Sampling() algorithm in [33] (Algo-
rithm 2, lines 1-13), with the difference that our Phase 1 is
to estimate a lower bound for ψ(k), while their purpose is to
estimate a lower bound for OPTk, the maximum influence
spread of any k seed nodes. The probabilistic analysis fol-
lows the same approach, and for completeness, we provide
an independent analysis for our algorithm.
Let θ′ be the number of RR sets generated in Phase 1,
and R
(1)
1 ,R
(1)
2 , . . . ,R
(1)
θ′ be these RR sets. Note that these
random RR sets are not mutually independent, because ear-
lier generated RR sets are used to determine if more RR
sets need to be generated (condition in line 12). However,
once RR sets R
(1)
1 , . . . ,R
(1)
i−1 are generated, the generation
of RR set R
(1)
i follows the same random behavior for each
i, which means we could use martingale approach [20] to
analyze these RR sets and Phase 1 of Algorithm ASV-RR.
Definition 3 (Martingale). A sequence of random
variables Y 1,Y 2,Y 3, . . . is a martingale, if and only if
E[|Y i|] < +∞ and E[Y i+1 | Y 1,Y 2, . . . ,Y i] = Y i for any
i ≥ 1.
In our case, let Y i(v) =
∑i
j=1(XR(1)j
(v)− ψv/n), for any
v ∈ V and any i.
Lemma 28. For every v ∈ V and every i ≥ 1,
E[X
R
(1)
i
(v) | X
R
(1)
1
(v), . . . , X
R
(1)
i−1
(v)] = ψv/n. As a con-
sequence, for every v ∈ V , the sequence of random variables
{Y i(v), i ≥ 1} is a martingale.
Proof. Consider a node v and an index i ≥ 1. Note
that RR setsR
(1)
1 , . . . ,R
(1)
i determines whetherR
(1)
i+1 should
be generated, but the actual random generation process of
R
(1)
i+1, i.e. selecting the random root and the random live
edge graph, is independent of R
(1)
1 , . . . ,R
(1)
i . Therefore, by
Lemma 23 we have
E
[
X
R
(1)
i
(v)
∣∣∣∣XR(1)1 (v), . . . , XR(1)i−1(v)
]
= ψv/n. (26)
From the definition of Y i(v), it is straightforward to see
that the value range of Y i(v) is [−i, i], and thus E(|Y i(v)|] <
+∞. Second, by definition Y i+1(v) = XR(1)i+1(v) − ψv/n +
Y i(v). With the similar argument as for Eq. (26), we have
E[Y i+1(v) | Y 1(v), . . . ,Y i(v)]
= E[X
R
(1)
i+1
(v)− ψv/n | Y 1(v), . . . ,Y i(v)]
+ E[Y i(v) | Y 1(v), . . . ,Y i(v)]
= 0 + Y i(v) = Y i(v).
Therefore, {Y i(v), i ≥ 1} is a martingale.
Martingales have similar tail bounds as the Chernoff
bound given in Fact 26, as we give below. For convenience,
we did not explicitly refer to the sequence below as a mar-
tingale, but notice that if we define Y i =
∑i
j=1(Xi − µ),
then {Y 1,Y 2, . . . ,Y t} is indeed a martingale.
Fact 29 (Martingale Tail Bounds). Let
X1,X2, . . . ,Xt be random variables with range [0, 1],
and for some µ ∈ [0, 1], E[Xi | X1,X2, . . . ,Xi−1] = µ for
every i ∈ [t]. Let Y = ∑ti=1Xi. For any δ > 0, we have:
Pr{Y − tµ ≥ δ · tµ} ≤ exp
(
− δ
2
2 + 2
3
δ
tµ
)
.
For any 0 < δ < 1, we have
Pr{Y − tµ ≤ −δ · tµ} ≤ exp
(
−δ
2
2
tµ
)
.
Since there are numerous variants of Chernoff and martin-
gale tail bounds in the literature, and the ones we found
in [20, 13, 33] are all slightly different from the above, in
Appendix E we provide a pair of general martingale tail
bounds that cover Facts 26 and 29 we need in this paper,
with a complete proof.
For each i = 1, 2, . . . , blog2 nc − 1, let xi = n/2i, and let
est
(k)
i be the value of est
(k) set in line 11 in the i-th iteration
of the for-loop (lines 4–16) of Phase 1.
Lemma 30. For each i = 1, 2, . . . , blog2 nc − 1,
(1) If xi = n/2
i > ψ(k), then with probability at least 1 −
1
2n` log2 n
, n · est (k)i /θi < (1 + ε′) · xi.
(2) If xi = n/2
i ≤ ψ(k), then with probability at least 1 −
1
2n` log2 n
, n · est (k)i /θi < (1 + ε′) · ψ(k).
Proof. Let R
(1)
1 ,R
(1)
2 , . . . ,R
(1)
θi
be the θi generated RR
sets by the end of the i-th iteration of the for-loop (lines 4–
16) of Phase 1. For every v ∈ V , let estv,i be the value
of estv at line 11 in the i-th iteration of the same for-loop.
Then we have estv,i =
∑θi
j=1 XR(1)j
(v).
By Lemma 28, we have for every 1 ≤ j ≤ θi, E[XR(1)i (v) |
X
R
(1)
1
(v), . . . , X
R
(1)
i−1
(v)] = ψv/n. Then we can apply the
martingale tail bound of Fact 29 on the sequence. For the
Statement (1) of the lemma, we consider xi = n/2
i > ψ(k),
and for every v ∈ V such that ψv ≤ ψ(k), we obtain
Pr{n · estv,i/θi ≥ (1 + ε′) · xi}
= Pr{estv,i ≥ (1 + ε′) · θi · xi/n}
≤ Pr{estv,i − θi · ψv/n ≥ (ε′ · xi/ψv) · θi · ψv/n}
≤ exp
(
− (ε
′ · xi/ψv)2
2 + 2
3
(ε′ · xi/ψv) · θi · ψv/n
)
= exp
(
− ε
′2 · x2i
2ψv +
2
3
· ε′ · xi · θi/n
)
≤ exp
(
− ε
′2 · xi
2 + 2
3
ε′
· θi/n
)
{use ψv ≤ ψ(k) < xi}
≤ 1
2n`+1 log2 n
. (27)
Note that est
(k)
i is the k-th largest among estv,i’s, while
there are at most k − 1 nodes v with ψv > ψ(k). This
means that there is at least one node v with ψv ≤ ψ(k) and
estv,i ≥ est (k)i . Thus, by taking union bound on Eq. (27),
we have
Pr{n · est (k)i /θi ≥ (1 + ε′) · xi}
≤ Pr{∃v ∈ V, ψv ≤ ψ(k), n · estv,i/θi ≥ (1 + ε′) · xi}
≤ 1
2n` log2 n
.
For the Statement (2) of the lemma, we consider xi =
n/2i ≤ ψ(k), and for every v ∈ V with ψv ≤ ψ(k), we have
Pr{n · estv,i/θi ≥ (1 + ε′) · ψ(k)}
= Pr{estv,i ≥ (1 + ε′) · θi · ψ(k)/n}
≤ Pr{estv,i − θi · ψv/n ≥ (ε′ · ψ(k)/ψv) · θi · ψv/n}
≤ exp
(
− (ε
′ · ψ(k)/ψv)2
2 + 2
3
(ε′ · ψ(k)/ψv) · θi · ψv/n
)
= exp
(
− ε
′2 · ψ(k)2
2ψv +
2
3
· ε′ · ψ(k) · θi/n
)
≤ exp
(
−ε
′2 · ψ(k)
2 + 2
3
ε′
· θi/n
)
{use ψv ≤ ψ(k)}
≤ exp
(
− ε
′2 · xi
2 + 2
3
ε′
· θi/n
)
{use xi ≤ ψ(k)}
≤ 1
2n`+1 log2 n
.
Similarly, by taking the union bound, we have
Pr{n · est (k)i /θi ≥ (1 + ε′) · ψ(k)}
≤ Pr{∃v ∈ V, ψv ≤ ψ(k), n · estv,i/θi ≥ (1 + ε′) · ψ(k)}
≤ 1
2n` log2 n
.
Thus the lemma holds.
Lemma 31. Suppose that ψ(k) ≥ 1. In the end of Phase
1, with probability at least 1− 1
2n`
, LB ≤ ψ(k).
Proof. Let LB i = n · est (k)i /(θi · (1 + ε′)). Suppose first
that ψ(k) ≥ xblog2 nc−1, and let i be the smallest index such
that ψ(k) ≥ xi. Thus, for each i′ ≤ i − 1, ψ(k) < xi′ . By
Lemma 30 (1), for each i′ ≤ i− 1, with probability at most
1
2n` log2 n
, n · est (k)i′ /θi′ ≥ (1 + ε′) · xi′ . Taking union bound,
we know that with probability at least 1− i−1
2n` log2 n
, for all
i′ ≤ i − 1, n · est (k)i′ /θi′ < (1 + ε′) · xi′ . This means, with
probability at least 1− i−1
2n` log2 n
, that the for-loop in Phase 1
would not break at the i′-th iteration for i′ ≤ i−1, and thus
LB = LB i′′ for some i
′′ ≥ i, or LB = 1. Since for every
i′′ ≥ i, we have xi′′ ≤ ψ(k), by Lemma 30 (2), for every such
i′′, with probability at most 1
2n` log2 n
, LB i′′ > ψ
(k). Taking
union bound again, we know that with probability at most
1
2n`
, LB > ψ(k).
Finally, if ψ(k) < xblog2 nc−1, use the similar argument
as the above, we can show that, with probability at least
1− 1
2n`
, the for-loop would not break at any iteration, which
means LB = 1, which still implies that LB ≤ ψ(k) since
ψ(k) ≥ 1.
Lemma 32 (Robust Estimator). Suppose that
ψ(k) ≥ 1. With probability at least 1 − 1
n`
, Algorithm
ASV-RR returns {ψˆv}v∈V that satisfy:{ |ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εψv ∀v ∈ V with ψv > ψ(k),
|ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εψ(k) ∀v ∈ V with ψv ≤ ψ(k).
Proof. By Lemma 31, we know that at the end of Phase
1, with probability at least 1− 1
2n`
, LB ≤ ψ(k).
Then by Lemma 27, we know that when we fix LB to any
fixed value LB with LB ≤ ψ(k), with probability at least
1− 1
2n`
, we have{ |ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εψv ∀v ∈ V with ψv > ψ(k),
|ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εψ(k) ∀v ∈ V with ψv ≤ ψ(k).
Taking the union bound, we know that with probability at
least 1− 1
n`
, we have{ |ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εψv ∀v ∈ V with ψv > ψ(k),
|ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εψ(k) ∀v ∈ V with ψv ≤ ψ(k).
C.3 Time Complexity of ASV-RR
Finally, we argue about the time complexity of the algo-
rithm. For this purpose, we need to refer to the martingale
stopping theorem, explained below.
A random variable τ is a stopping time for martingale
{Y i, i ≥ 1} if τ takes positive integer values, and the event
τ = i depends only on the values of Y 1,Y 2, . . . ,Y i. The
following martingale stopping theorem is an important fact
for our analysis.
Fact 33 (Martingale Stopping Theorem [20]).
Suppose that {Y i, i ≥ 1} is a martingale and τ is a
stopping time for {Y i, i ≥ 1}. If τ ≤ c for some constant c
independent of {Y i, i ≥ 1}, then E[Y τ ] = E[Y 1].2
Given a fixed set R ⊆ V , let the width of R, denoted
ω(R), be the total in-degrees of nodes in R. By Assumption
1, the time complexity to generate the random RR set R is
Θ(ω(R) + 1). We leave the constant 1 in the above formula
because ω(R) could be less than 1 or even o(1) when m < n,
while Θ(1) time is needed just to select a random root. The
expected time complexity to generate a random RR set is
Θ(E[ω(R)] + 1).
Let EPT = E[ω(R)] be the expected width of a random
RR set. Let θ′ be the random variable denoting the number
of RR sets generated in Phase 1.
Lemma 34. Under Assumption 1, the expected running
time of ASV-RR is Θ((E[θ′] + E[θ]) · (EPT + 1)).
Proof. Let R
(1)
1 ,R
(1)
2 , . . . ,R
(1)
θ′ be the RR sets gener-
ated in Phase 1. Under Assumption 1, for each RR set R
(1)
j ,
the time to generate R
(1)
j is Θ(ω(R
(1)
j ) + 1), where the con-
stant Θ(1) term is to accommodate the time just to select a
random root node for the RR set, and it is not absorbed by
Θ(ω(R
(1)
j ) because the width of an RR set could be less than
1. After generating R
(1)
j , ASV-RR also needs to go through
all entries u ∈ R(1)j to update estu (line 9), which takes
Θ(|R(1)j |) time. Note that for every random RR set R, we
have |R| ≤ ω(R)+1, because the RR set generation process
guarantees that the induced sub-graph of any RR set must
be weakly connected. Thus, for each RR set R
(1)
j , ASV-RR
takes Θ(ω(R
(1)
j ) + 1 + |R(1)j |) = Θ(ω(R(1)j ) + 1) time, and
summing up for all θ′ RR sets, the total running time of
Phase 1 is Θ(
∑θ′
j=1(ω(R
(1)
j ) + 1)).
2There are two other alternative conditions besides that τ
is bounded by a constant, but they are not needed in our
analysis and thus are omitted.
We define W i =
∑i
j=1(ω(R
(1)
j )−EPT ), for i ≥ 1. By an
argument similar to Lemma 28, we know that {W i, i ≥ 1} is
a martingale. Moreover, θ′ is a stopping time of {W i, i ≥ 1}
because its value is only determined by the RR sets already
generated. The value of θ′ is upper bounded by θblog2 nc−1,
which is a constant set in line 6. Therefore, we can apply
the martingale stopping theorem (Fact 33) and obtain
0 = E[W 1] = E[W θ′ ] = E
 θ′∑
j=1
ω(R
(1)
j )− θ′ · EPT

= E
 θ′∑
j=1
ω(R
(1)
j )
− E[θ′] · EPT.
This implies that the expected running time of Phase 1 is
Θ(E[θ′] · (EPT + 1)).
For Phase 2, all θ RR sets are independently generated,
and thus the expected running time of Phase 2 is Θ(E[θ] ·
(EPT + 1)). Together, we know that the expected running
time of ASV-RR is Θ((E[θ′] + E[θ]) · (EPT + 1)).
We now connecting EPT with the influence spread of a
single node, first established in [34] (Lemma 7). For com-
pleteness, we include a proof here.
Lemma 35 (Expected Width of Random RR Sets).
Let v˜ be a random node drawn from V with probability
proportional to the in-degree of v˜. Let R be a random RR
set. Then:
EPT = ER[ω(R)] =
m
n
Ev˜[σ({v˜})].
Proof. For a fixed set R ⊆ V , let p(R) be the probability
that a randomly selected edge (from E) points to a node in
R. Since R has ω(R) edges pointing to nodes in R, we have
p(R) = ω(R)/m.
Let dv denotes the in-degree of node v. Let v˜ be a random
node drawn from v with probability proportional to the in-
degree of v˜. We have:
p(R) =
∑
(u,v)∈E
1
m
· I{v ∈ R}
=
∑
v∈V
dv
m
· I{v ∈ R} = Ev˜[I{v˜ ∈ R}].
Let R be a random RR set. Then, we have:
ER[ω(R)] =m · ER[p(R)]
=m · ER[Ev˜[I{v˜ ∈ R}]]
=m · Ev˜[ER[I{v˜ ∈ R}]]
=m · Ev˜[Pr
R
(v˜ ∈ R)]
=m · Ev˜[σ({v˜})/n],
where the last equality is by Lemma 22.
Next we need to bound E[θ′] and E[θ].
Lemma 36. For each i = 1, 2, . . . , blog2 nc − 1, if ψ(k) ≥
(1 + ε′)2 · xi, then with probability at least 1 − k2n`+1 log2 n ,
n · est (k)i /θi > ψ(k)/(1 + ε′), and n · est (k)i /θi > (1 + ε′) · xi.
Proof. Let R
(1)
1 ,R
(1)
2 , . . . ,R
(1)
θi
be the θi generated RR
sets by the end of the i-th iteration of the for-loop (lines 4–
16) of Phase 1. For every v ∈ V , let estv,i be the value
of estv at line 11 in the i-th iteration of the same for-loop.
Then we have estv,i =
∑θi
j=1 XR(1)j
(v).
Suppose that ψ(k) ≥ (1 + ε′)2 · xi. For every node v ∈ V
with ψv ≥ ψ(k), we apply the lower tail of the martingale
tail bound (Fact 29) and obtain
Pr{n · estv,i/θi ≤ ψv/(1 + ε′)}
≤ Pr{estv,i ≤ 1
1 + ε′
· θi · ψv/n}
= Pr{estv,i − θi · ψv/n ≤ − ε
′
1 + ε′
· θi · ψv/n}
≤ exp
(
− ε
′2
2(1 + ε′)2
· θi · ψv/n
)
≤ exp
(
−ε
′2 · xi
2n
· θi
)
{use xi ≤ ψ(k)(1+ε′)2 ≤ ψv(1+ε′)2 }
≤ 1
2n`+1 log2 n
.
Note that est
(k)
i is the k-th largest value among
{estv,i}v∈V , or equivalently (n − k + 1)-th smallest among
{estv,i}v∈V . But there are at most n − k nodes v with
ψv < ψ
(k), which means that there is at least one node v
with ψv ≥ ψ(k) and estv,i ≤ est (k)i . To be precise, such a
v has ψv ranked before or the same as ψ
(k), and thus there
are at most k such nodes. Then we have
Pr{n · est (k)i /θi ≤ ψ(k)/(1 + ε′)}
≤ Pr{∃v ∈ V, ψv ≥ ψ(k), n · estv,i/θi ≤ ψv/(1 + ε′)}
≤ kPr{n · estv,i/θi ≤ ψv/(1 + ε′)}
≤ k
2n`+1 log2 n
.
Since ψ(k) ≥ (1 + ε′)2 · xi, we have that n · est (k)i /θi >
ψ(k)/(1 + ε′) implies that n · est (k)i /θi > (1 + ε′) · xi.
Lemma 37. For both θ′ and θ, we have E[θ′] =
O(`n logn/(ψ(k)ε2)) and E[θ′] = O(`n logn/(ψ(k)ε2)), when
` ≥ (log2 k − log2 log2 n)/ log2 n.
Proof. If ψ(k) < (1 + ε′)2 ·xblog2 nc−1, then ψ(k) < 4(1 +
ε′)2. In this case, in the worst case,
θ′ = θblog2 nc−1
≤
⌈
n · ((`+ 1) lnn+ ln log2 n+ ln 2) · (2 + 23ε′)
ε′2
⌉
≤
⌈
n · ((`+ 1) lnn+ ln log2 n+ ln 2) · (2 + 23ε′) · 4(1 + ε′)2
ε′2 · ψ(k)
⌉
= O(`n logn/(ψ(k)ε2)),
where the last equality uses the fact that ε′ =
√
2 · ε, and
the big O notation is for sufficiently small ε. Similarly, for
θ, since LB ≥ 1, we have
θ ≤
⌈
n((`+ 1) lnn+ ln 4)(2 + 2
3
ε)
ε2
⌉
≤
⌈
n((`+ 1) lnn+ ln 4)(2 + 2
3
ε) · 4(1 + ε′)2
ε2 · ψ(k)
⌉
= O(`n logn/(ψ(k)ε2)).
Therefore, the lemma holds when ψ(k) < (1+ε′)2·xblog2 nc−1.
Now suppose that ψ(k) ≥ (1 + ε′)2 · xblog2 nc−1. Let i be
the smallest index such that ψ(k) ≥ (1 + ε′)2 · xi. Thus
ψ(k) < (1 + ε′)2 · xi−1 = 2(1 + ε′)2xi (denote x0 = n).
For E[θ′], by Lemma 36, with probability at least 1 −
k
2n`+1 log2 n
, n · est (k)i /θi > (1 + ε′) · xi, which means that
Phase 1 would stop in the i-th iteration, and thus
θ′ = θi =
⌈
n · ((`+ 1) lnn+ ln log2 n+ ln 2) · (2 + 23ε′)
ε′2 · xi
⌉
≤
⌈
n · ((`+ 1) lnn+ ln log2 n+ ln 2) · (2 + 23ε′) · 2(1 + ε′)2
ε′2 · ψ(k)
⌉
= O(`n logn/(ψ(k)ε2)), (28)
where the last equality uses the fact that ε′ =
√
2 · ε.
When Phase 1 stops at the i-th iteration, we know that
LB = n · est (k)i /(θi · (1 + ε′)) ≥ ψ(k)/(1 + ε′)2, again by
Lemma 36. Then, for Phase 2 we have
θ ≤
⌈
n((`+ 1) lnn+ ln 4)(2 + 2
3
ε) · (1 + ε′)2
ε2 · ψ(k)
⌉
= O(`n logn/(ψ(k)ε2)). (29)
With probability at most k
2n`+1 log2 n
, Phase 1 does not
stop at the i-th iteration and continues to iterations i′ > i.
In the worst case, it continues to iteration blog2 nc − 1, and
θ′ = O(`n logn/ε2). Combining with Eq. (28), we have
E[θ′] = O(`n logn/(ψ(k)ε2)) + k
2n`+1 log2 n
·O(`n logn/ε2)
= O(`n logn/(ψ(k)ε2)),
where the last equality uses the fact that ψ(k) ≤ n, and the
condition that ` ≥ (log2 k − log2 log2 n)/ log2 n. Similarly,
for Phase 2, in the worst case LB = 1 and we have θ =
O(`n logn/ε2). Combining with Eq. (29), we have
E[θ] = O(`n logn/(ψ(k)ε2)) + 1
2n`+1 log2 n
·O(`n logn/ε2)
= O(`n logn/(ψ(k)ε2)).
This concludes the lemma.
We remark that, the setting of ε′ =
√
2 ·ε is to balance the
complicated terms appearing in the upper bound of E[θ′] +
E[θ], as suggested in [33].
Lemma 38 (Shapley Value Estimators: Scalability).
Under Assumption 1 and the condition ` ≥
(log2 k − log2 log2 n)/ log2 n, the expected running time
of ASV-RR is O(`n logn · (EPT + 1)/(ψ(k)ε2)) =
O(`(m+n) logn ·E[σ(v˜)]/(ψ(k)ε2)), where EPT = E[ω(R)]
is the expected width of a random RR set, and v˜ is a
random node drawn from V with probability proportional to
the in-degree of v˜.
Proof. The result is immediate from Lemmas 34, 35,
and 37.
Together, Lemmas 24, 25, 32 and 38 establish Theorem 3.
C.4 On Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 4 follows the same proof structure
as the proof of Theorem 3. The only difference is to replace
the definition XR(v) with the following X
′
R(v):
X ′R(v) =
{
0 if v 6∈ R;
1 if v ∈ R.
Then, by Eq. (23) in Lemma 22, we know that the SNI cen-
trality of node v is: ψSNIv (I) = σI({v}) = n · ER[XR(v)].
This replaces the corresponding Lemma 23 for Shapley cen-
trality. In the rest of the proof of Theorem 3, we replace
every occurrence of XR(v) with X
′
R(v) and keep in mind
that now ψ refers to the SNI centrality, then all the analy-
sis went through without change for SNI centrality, and thus
Theorem 4 holds (Lemma 25 for absolute normalization does
not apply to SNI centrality and no other result depends on
this lemma).
C.5 Adaptation to Near-Linear-Time Algo-
rithm
We remark that, if we want a near-linear time algorithm
for Shapley or SNI centrality with some relaxation in robust-
ness, we can make an easy change to Algorithm ASV-RR or
ASNI-RR as follows. In line 9, replace estu = estu + 1/|R|
with estu = estu + 1, and use parameter k = 1. What this
does is to estimate a lower bound LB of the largest single
node influence σ∗1 = maxv∈V σ({v}). Note that for line 22, it
is still the case that, for ASV-RR we use estu = estu+1/|R|
while for ASNI-RR we use estu = estu + 1. Then we have
this alternative result:
Theorem 6. If we use k = 1 and replace estu = estu +
1/|R| in line 9 of Algorithm 1 with estu = estu + 1, while
keeping the rest the same for ASV-RR and ASNI-RR respec-
tively, then the revised algorithm guarantees that with prob-
ability at least 1− 1
n`
;
|ψˆv − ψv| ≤ εσ∗1 , ∀v ∈ V,
with expected running time O(`(m+ n) logn/ε2). Note that
ψv above represents Shapley centrality of v for ASV-RR and
SNI centrality of v for ASNI-RR, and ψˆv is the algorithm
output for the corresponding estimated centrality of v.
The proof of Theorem 6 would follow exactly the same
structure as the proof of Theorem 3. To complete the proof,
one only needs to observe that by Lemma 22, σ({u}) =
n · E[I{u ∈ R}] with a random RR set R, and thus after
changing to estu = estu + 1 in line 9, n · estu/θi provides
an estimate of σ({u}) at the end of the i-th iteration of
Phase 1. This means that LB obtained in Phase 1 is an
estimate of the lower bound of the largest single node influ-
ence σ∗1 . Thus, essentially we only need to replace ψ
(k) with
σ∗1 everywhere in the proof and the theorem statement. Fi-
nally, because E[σ(v˜)] ≤ σ∗1 , the time complexity no longer
has the extra ratio term E[σ(v˜)]/σ∗1 . The detailed proof is
thus omitted.
D. EXTENSION TO WEIGHTED INFLU-
ENCE MODELS
In this section, we extend our results to models with
weighted influence-spread functions. We focus on the ex-
tension of Shapley centrality, and results on SNI centrality
can be similarly derived. The extended model uses node
weights to capture the practical “nodes are not equal when
activated” in network influence. Let w : V → R be a non-
negative weight function over V , i.e., w(v) ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ V .
For any subset S ⊆ V , let w(S) = ∑v∈S w(v). We can ex-
tend the cardinality-based influence spread σ(S) to weighted
influence spread: σw(S) = E[w(I(S))]. Here, the influence
spread is weighted based on the value of activated nodes in
I(S). Note that, in the equivalent live-edge graph model
for the triggering model, we have: σw(S) = EL[w(Γ(L, S))].
Note also that set function σw(S) is still monotone and sub-
modular. The influence instance I is extended to include
weight w.
D.1 Algorithm ASV-RR-W
Our Algorithm ASV-RR can be extended to the trigger-
ing model with weighted influence spreads. Algorithm ASV-
RR-W follows essentially the same steps of ASV-RR. The
only exception is that, when generating a random RR set
R rooted at a random node v (either in Phase 1 or Phase
2), we select the root v with probability proportional to the
weights of nodes. To differentiate from random v ∼ V , we
use vw ∼w V to denote a random node vw selected from V
according to node weights. The random RR set generated
from root vw is denoted as R(vw). All the other aspects
of the algorithm remains exactly the same. In particular,
the statement of Theorem 3 remains essentially the same,
except that ψ is now the Shapley centrality of the weighted
influence instance I = (G,E, PI , w).
The proof of Lemma 22 is changed accordingly to:
σw(S) =n · EL [Euw [I{uw ∈ Γ(L, S)}]]
=n · EL,uw [I{Γ−(L,uw) ∩ S 6= ∅}],
where Γ−(L, u) is the set of nodes in graph L that can reach
u, and uw is a random node drawn proportionally accord-
ing to weight function w. With random live-edge graph L,
Γ−(L, u) is the same as the RR set generated from root u,
which is denoted as R(u). Thus, we have:
σw(S) =n · ER(),uw [I{R(uw) ∩ S 6= ∅}]
=n · Pr
R(),uw
(R(uw) ∩ S 6= ∅),
where the notationR() means the randomness is only on the
random generation of reversed reachable set, but not on the
random choice of the root node. We use R() to distinguish
it from R, which include the randomness of selecting the
root node. Weighted marginal spread σw(S ∪ {v})− σw(S)
can be similarly argued.
The rest of the proof, including the proof on robustness
and time complexity, essentially remains the same as given
in Appendix C.
D.2 Centrality Axioms for Weighted Influ-
ence Models
In this section, we presented our axiomatic analysis for
weighted influence models.
Weighted Social-Influence Instances
Mathematically, a weighted social-influence instance is a 4-
tuple IW = (V,E, PI ,W ), where (1) the influence instance
I = (V,E, PI) characterizes the probabilistic profile of the
influence model. (2) W is a non-negative weight function
over V , i.e., W (v) ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ V . Although W does not
impact the influence process, it defines the value of the acti-
vated set, and hence impacts the influence-spread profile of
the model: The weighted influence spread σIW is then given
by:
σIW (S) = E[W (II(S))] =
∑
T⊇S
PI(S, T )W (T ).
Note that here we use the capital letter W as the weight
function that is integrated into the weighted influence in-
stance IW = (V,E, PI ,W ). The capital letter W is used
to differentiate from the small letter w used later as the
parametrized weight function outside the influence instance.
Because I and W address different aspects of the weighted
influence model, IW = (V,E, PI ,W ), we assume they are
independent of each other. We also extend the definition of
centrality measure (Definition 1) to weighted centrality mea-
sure, which is a mapping from a weighted influence instance
IW = (V,E, PI ,W ) to a real vector in R|V |. We use ψW to
denote such a mapping.
Extension of Axioms 1-5
• Axiom 1 (Anonymity) has a natural extension, if when
we permute the influence-distribution-profile I with a
pi, we also permute weight function W by pi. We will
come back to this if-condition shortly.
• Axiom 2 (Normalization) is slightly changed such that
the sum of the centrality measures is the total weights
of all nodes:
Axiom 8 (Weighted Normalization). For ev-
ery weighted influence instance IW = (V,E, PI ,W ),∑
v∈V ψv(I) = W (V ).
• Axiom 3 (Independence of Sink Nodes) remains the
same.
• Axiom 4 (Bayesian Influence) remains the same.
• Axiom 5 (Bargaining with Critical Sets) is replaced by
the following natural weighted version:
Axiom 9. (Weighted Bargaining with Criti-
cal Sets) For the weighted critical set instance IWR,v =
(R∪{v}, E, PIR,v ,W ), the weighted centrality measure
of v is |R|W (v)|R|+1 , i.e. ψ
W
v (IWR,v) = |R|W (v)|R|+1 .
The justification of the above axiom follows the same
Nash bargaining argument for the non-weighted case.
Now the threat point is (W (R), 0) and the slack is
W (v). The solution of
(x1, x2) ∈ argmax
x1≥r,x2≥0,x1+x2=r+1
(x1 −W (R))1/r · x2
gives the fair share of v as |R|W (v)|R|+1 .
Characterization of Weighted Social Influence
Model
Let AW denote the set of Axioms 1, 3, 4, , 8 and 9. Let
weighted Shapley centrality, denoted as ψW,Shapley, be the
Shapley value of the weighted influence spread σIW , i.e.,
ψW,Shapley(IW ) = φShapley(σIW ). We now prove the follow-
ing characterization theorem for weighted influence models:
Theorem 7. (Shapley Centrality of Weighted So-
cial Influence) Among all weighted centrality measures,
the weighted Shapley centrality ψW,Shapley is the unique
weighted centrality measure that satisfies axiom set AW (Ax-
ioms 1, 3, 4, 8, and 9).
The proof of Theorem 7 follows the same proof structure
of Theorem 1, and the main extension is on building a new
full-rank basis for the space of weighted influence instances
{IW }, since this space has higher dimension than the un-
weighted influence instances {I}.
Lemma 39 (Weighted Soundness). The weighted
Shapley centrality ψW,Shapley satisfies all Axioms in AW .
Proof Sketch. The proof essentially follows the same
proof of Lemma 6, after replacing unweighted influence
spread σI with weighted influence spread σIW . Note that
the proof of Lemma 6 relies on earlier lemmas on the proper-
ties of sink nodes, which would be extended to the weighted
version. In particular, the result of Lemma 2 (a) is extended
to:
σIW (S ∪ {v})− σIW (S) = Pr(v 6∈ II(S)) ·W (v).
Lemma 4 is extended to:
σI\{v}W (S) = σIW (S)− Pr(v ∈ II(S)) ·W (v).
All other results in Lemmas 2–5 are either the same, or ex-
tended by replacing σI and σI\{v} to σIW and σI\{v}W , re-
spectively. With the above extension, the proof of Lemma 39
follows in the same way as the proof of Lemma 6.
To prove the uniqueness, consider the profile of a weighted
influence instance IW = (V,E, PI ,W ). Comparing to the
corresponding unweighted influence instance I = (V,E, PI),
IW has n = |V | additional dimensions for the weights of
the nodes, and thus we need n additional parameters to
specify node weights. Recall that in the proof of Theorem 1,
we overload the notation PI as a vector of M dimensions
to represent the influence probability profile of unweighted
influence instance I = (V,E, PI). Similarly, we overload
W to represent a vector of n dimensions for the weights of
n nodes. Together, we use vector (PI ,W ) to represent a
vector of M ′ = M + n dimensions that fully determines a
weighted influence instance I.
We now need to construct a set of basis vectors in RM
′
,
each of which corresponds to a weighted influence instance.
The construction is still based on the critical set instance
defined in Definition 2. For every R ⊆ V with R 6∈ {∅, V }
and every U ⊃ R, we consider the critical set instance IR,U
with uniform weights (i.e. all nodes have weight 1). We
use ~1 to denote the uniform weight vector. Then vector
(PIR,U ,~1) ∈ RM
′
is the vector specifying the corresponding
weighted critical set influence instance, denoted as I~1R,U . Let
~ei ∈ Rn be the unit vector with i-th entry being 1 and all
other entries being 0, for i ∈ [n]. Then ~ei corresponds to
a weight assignment where the i-th node has weight 1, and
all other nodes have weight 0. Consider the null influence
instance IN , in which every node is an isolated node, same
as defined in Lemma 12. We add weight vector ~ei to the
null instance IN , to construct a unit-weight null instance
IN,~ei , where every node is an isolated node, the i-th node
has weight 1, and the rest have weight 0, for every i ∈ [n].
The vector representation of IN,~ei is (PIN , ~ei). Note that,
as already argued in the proof of Lemma 12, vector PIN is
the all-0 vector in RM .
Given the above preparation, we now define V ′ as the set
containing all the above vectors, that is:
V ′ ={(PIR,U ,~1) | R,U ⊆ V,R /∈ {∅, V }, R ⊂ U}
∪ {(PIN , ~ei) | i ∈ [n]}.
We prove the following lemma:
Lemma 40 (Independence of Weighted Influence).
Vectors in V ′ are linearly independent in the space RM′ .
Proof. Our proof extends the proof of Lemma 10. Sup-
pose, for a contradiction, that vectors in V ′ are not linearly
independent. Then for each R and U with R,U ⊆ V,R /∈
{∅, V }, R ⊂ U , we have a number αR,U ∈ R, and for each i
we have a number αi ∈ R, such that:∑
R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
αR,U · (PIR,U ,~1) +
∑
i∈[n]
αi · (PIN , ~ei) = ~0,
(30)
and at least some αR,U 6= 0 or some αi 6= 0. Suppose
first that some αR,U 6= 0. Let S be the smallest set with
αS,U 6= 0 for some U ⊃ S, and let T be any superset of S
with αS,T 6= 0. By the critical set instance definition, we
have PIS,T (S, T ) = 1. Since the vector does not contain any
dimension corresponding to PI(S, S), we know that T ⊃
S. Moreover, since PIN is an all-0 vector, we know that
PIN (S, T ) = 0.
Then by the minimality of S, we have:
0 =
∑
R,U :R 6∈{∅,V },R⊂U
αR,U · PIR,U (S, T )
= αS,T · PIS,T (S, T ) +
∑
U :U⊃S,U 6=T
αS,U · PIS,U (S, T )+∑
R,U :|R|≥|S|,R 6=S,U⊃R
αR,U · PIR,U (S, T )
= αS,T +
∑
U :U⊃S,U 6=T
αS,U · PIS,U (S, T )+∑
R,U :|R|≥|S|,R 6=S,U⊃R
αR,U · PIR,U (S, T ).
Following the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 10,
we have αS,T = 0, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, we know that αR,U = 0 for all R,U pairs, and
there must be some i with αi 6= 0. However, when all αR,U ’s
are 0, what left in Eq. (30) is
∑
i∈[n] αi · ~ei = ~0. But since
vectors ~ei’s are obviously linearly independent, the above
cannot be true unless all αi’s are 0, another contradiction.
Therefore, vectors in V ′ are linearly independent.
Lemma 41 (Centrality Uniqueness of the Basis).
Fix a set V . Let ψW be a weighted centrality measure that
satisfies axiom set AW . For any instance IW that
corresponds to a vector in V ′, the centrality ψ(IW ) is
unique.
Proof. Suppose first that IW is a weighted critical set
instance I~1R,U . Since I~1R,U has the same weight for all nodes,
its weighted centrality uniqueness can be argued in the exact
same way as in the proof of Lemma 9 (except that the un-
weighted Axioms 2 and 5 are replaced by the corresponding
weighted Axioms 8 and 9).
Now suppose that IW is one of the instances IN,~ei , for
some i ∈ [n]. Since in instance IN,~ei all nodes are isolated
nodes, and thus sink nodes, for each node v, we can repeat-
edly apply the Sink Node Axiom (Axiom 3) to remove all
other nodes until v is the only node in the graph, and this re-
peated projection will not change the centrality of v. When
v is the only node in the graph, by the Weighted Normaliza-
tion Axiom (Axiom 8), we know that v’s weighted centrality
measure is W (v). Since the weights of all nodes are deter-
mined by the vector ~ei, the weighted centrality of IN,~ei is
fully determined and is unique.
Lemma 42 (Weighted Completeness). The
weighted centrality measure satisfying axiom set AW
is unique.
Proof Sketch. The proof follows the proof structure of
Lemma 12. Lemma 40 already show that V ′ is a set of basis
vectors in the space RM
′
, and Lemma 41 further shows that
instances corresponding to these basis vectors have unique
weighted centrality measures. In addition, we define the
0-weight null instance IN,~0 to be an instance in which all
nodes are isolated nodes, and all nodes have weight 0. Then
the vector corresponding to IN,~0 is the all-0 vector in RM′ .
Moreover, similar to IN,~ei , the weighted centrality of IN,~0
satisfying axiom set AW is also uniquely determined.
With the above preparation, the rest of the proof fol-
lows exactly the same logic as the one in the proof of
Lemma 12.
Proof of Theorem 7. Theorem 7 follows from Lem-
mas 39 and 42.
Axiom Set Parametrized by Node Weights
The above axiomatic characterization is based on the di-
rect axiomatic extension from unweighted influence models
to the weighted influence models, where node weight func-
tion W is directly added as part of the influence instance.
One may further ask the question: “What if we treat node
weights as parameters outside the influence instance? Is
it possible to have an axiomatic characterization on such
parametrized influence models, for every weight function?”
The answer to the above question would further highlight
the impact of the weight function to the influence model.
Since our goal is to achieve axiomatization that works for
every weight function, we may need to seek for stronger ax-
ioms.
To achieve the above goal, for a given set V , we as-
sume that the node weight function cannot be permuted.
To differentiate parametrized weight function from the inte-
grated weight function W discussed before, we use small
letter w to represent the parametrized weight function:
w : V → R+ ∪ {0}. The weight parameter w appearing
on the superscripts of notations such as influence instance
I and influence spread σ denotes that these quantities are
parametrized by weight function w. The influence spread σwI
in influence instance I = (V,E, PI) parametrized by weight
w is defined as:
σwI (S) = E[w(II(S))] =
∑
T⊇S
PI(S, T )w(T ).
We would like to provide a natural axiom set Aw
parametrized by w : V → R+ ∪ {0}, such that the Shap-
ley value for the weighted influence spread σw, denoted as
ψw,Shapley(I) = φShapley(σwI ), is the unique weighted cen-
trality measure satisfying the axiom set Aw, for every such
weight function w. Recall that the weight function w satis-
fies that w(v) ≥ 0 for all v ∈ V . Let ψw denote a centrality
measure satisfying the axiom set Aw.
Our Axiom set Aw contains the weighted version of Ax-
ioms 2–5, namely Axioms 3, 4, 8, and 9 (of course, notation
W (v) is replaced by w(v)). But it also needs an replacement
of the Anonymity Axiom (Axiom 1).
By making w “independent” of the distribution profile of
the influence model I = (V,E, PI), the extension of Axiom
Anonymity does not seem to have a direct weighted version.
Conceptually, Axiom Anonymity is about node symmetry
in the influence model. However, when influence instance is
parametrized by node weights, which cannot be permuted
and may not be uniform, even if the influence instance I
has node symmetry, it does not imply that their weighted
centrality is still the same. This is precisely the reason we
assume w can not be permuted.
Therefore, we are seeking a new property about node sym-
metry in the influence model parametrized by node weights
to replace Axiom Anonymity. We first define node pair sym-
metry as follows. We denote piuv as the permutation in which
u and v are mapped to each other while other nodes are
mapped to themselves.
Definition 4. A node pair u, v ∈ V is symmetric in the
influence instance I if for every S, T ⊆ V , PI(S, T ) =
PI(piuv(S), piuv(T )), where piuv(S) = {piuv(v′) | v′ ∈ S}.
We now give the axiom about node symmetry in the
weighted case, related to sink nodes and social influence pro-
jections.
Axiom 10 (Weighted Node Symmetry). In an in-
fluence instance I = (V,E, PI), let S be the set of sink
nodes. If every pair of none-sink nodes are symmetric, then
for any v ∈ S and any u 6∈ S, ψwu (I) = ψwu (I \ {v}) +
1
|V \S| (w(v)− ψwv (I)).
We justify the above axiom as follows. Consider a sink node
v ∈ S. ψwv (I) is its fair share to the influence game. Since
v cannot influence other nodes but may be influenced by
others, its fair share is at most its weight w(v) (can be for-
mally proved). Thus the leftover share of v, w(v) − ψwv (I),
is divided among the rest nodes. Since sink nodes do not
influence others, they should have no contribution for the
above leftover share from v. Thus, the leftover share should
be divided only among the rest non-sink nodes. By the as-
sumption of the axiom, all non-sink nodes are symmetric
to one another, therefore they equally divide w(v)−ψwv (I),
leading to 1|V \S| (w(v)−ψwv (I)) contribution from each non-
sink node. Here an important remark is that, the weights of
the non-sink nodes do not play a role in dividing the leftover
share form v. This is because, the weight of a node is an
indication of the node’s importance when it is influenced,
but not its power in influencing others. In other words,
the influence power is determined by the influence instance
I, in particular PI , and it is unrelated to node weights.
Therefore, the above equal division of the leftover share is
reasonable. After this division, we can apply the influence
projection to remove sink node v, and the remaining share
of a non-sink node u is simply the share of u in the projected
instance.
The parametrized weighted axiom set Aw is formed by
Axioms 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, and 10 (after replacing the weight
notation W () with w() in the corresponding axioms). We
define the weighted Shapley centrality ψw,Shapley(I) as the
Shapley value of the weighted influence spread φShapley(σw).
Note that this definition coincides with the definition of
ψW,Shapley(IW ), that is, whether or not we treat the weight
function as an outside parameter or integrated into the influ-
ence instance, the weighted version of Shapley centrality is
the same. The following theorem summarizes the axiomatic
characterization for the case of parametrized weighted influ-
ence model.
Theorem 8. (Parametrized Weighted Shapley
Centrality of Social Influence) Fix a node set V .
For any normalized and non-negative node weight func-
tion w : V → R+ ∪ {0}, the weighted Shapley centrality
ψw,Shapley is the unique weighted centrality measure that
satisfies axiom set Aw (Axioms 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, and 10).
Lemma 43. If v is a sink node in I, then for any S ⊆
V \ {v}, (a) σwI (S ∪ {v}) − σwI (S) = w(v) Pr(v 6∈ II(S));
and (b) σwI\{v}(S) = σ
w
I (S)− w(v) Pr(v ∈ II(S)).
Proof. The proof follows the proofs of Lemma 2 (a) and
Lemma 4, except replacing 1 with weight w(v).
Lemma 44. If node pair u, u′ are symmetric in I, then
for any v ∈ V \{u, u′}, (a) for any S ⊆ V , Pr(v ∈ II(S)) =
Pr(v ∈ II(piuu′(S)))’ (b) for any random permutation pi′ on
V \ {v}, Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u))] = Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u′))],
and Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u ∪ {u}))] = Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u′ ∪
{u′}))].
Proof. For (a), by the definition of symmetric node pair
(Definition 4), we have
Pr(v ∈ II(S)) =
∑
T⊇S∪{v}
PI(S, T )
=
∑
T⊇S∪{v}
PI(piuu′(S), piuu′(T ))
=
∑
pi−1
uu′ (T )⊇S∪{v}
PI(piuu′(S), T )
=
∑
T⊇piuu′ (S)∪{v}
PI(piuu′(S), T ) = Pr(v ∈ II(piuu′(S))).
For (b), we use (a) and obtain
Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u))] = Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(piuu′(Spi′,u)))].
Note that piuu′(Spi′,u) is a random set obtained by first gen-
erating a random permutation pi′, then selecting the prefix
node set Spi′,u before node u in pi
′, and finally replacing
the possible occurrence of u′ in Spi′,u with u (u cannot oc-
cur in Spi′,u so there is no replacement of u with u
′). This
random set can be equivalently obtained by first generating
the random permutation pi′, then switching the position of
u and u′ (denote the new random permutation piuu′(pi
′)),
and finally selecting the prefix node set Spiuu′ (pi′),u′ before
u′ in piuu′(pi
′). We note that random permutations pi′ and
piuu′(pi
′) follow the same distribution, and thus we have
Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u))] = Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u′))].
The equality Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u ∪ {u}))] = Epi′ [Pr(v ∈
II(Spi′,u′ ∪ {u′}))] can be argued in the same way.
Lemma 45 (Weighted Soundness). Weighted Shap-
ley centrality ψw,Shapley(I) satisfies all axioms in Aw.
Proof. Satisfaction of Axioms 2, 3, 4, 8 and 9 can be
similarly verified as in the proof of Lemma 39. We now
verify Axiom 10.
Let v be a sink node and u be a non-sink node. Let pi′ be
a random permutation on node set V \ {v}. We have
ψw,Shapleyu (I) = Epi[σwI (Spi,u ∪ {u})− σwI (Spi,u)]
= Pr(u ≺pi v)Epi[σwI (Spi,u ∪ {u})− σwI (Spi,u) | u ≺pi v]+
Pr(v ≺pi u)Epi[σwI (Spi,u ∪ {u})− σwI (Spi,u) | v ≺pi u]
= Epi′ [σwI (Spi′,u ∪ {u})− σwI (Spi′,u)]/2+
Epi[σwI (Spi,u ∪ {u})− σwI (Spi,u) | v ≺pi u]/2
= Epi′ [σwI (Spi′,u ∪ {u})− σwI (Spi′,u)]/2+
Epi[σwI (Spi,u \ {v} ∪ {u})− σwI (Spi,u \ {v}) | v ≺pi u]/2
+ w(v)Epi[Pr(v 6∈ II(Spi,u \ {v} ∪ {u}))−
Pr(v 6∈ II(Spi,u \ {v})) | v ≺pi u]/2 (31)
= Epi′ [σwI (Spi′,u ∪ {u})− σwI (Spi′,u)]
+ w(v)Epi′ [Pr(v 6∈ II(Spi′,u ∪ {u}))−
Pr(v 6∈ II(Spi′,u))]/2
= Epi′ [σwI\{v}(Spi′,u ∪ {u})− σwI\{v}(Spi′,u)]
+ w(v)Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u ∪ {u}))−
Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u))]
+ w(v)Epi′ [Pr(v 6∈ II(Spi′,u ∪ {u}))−
Pr(v 6∈ II(Spi′,u))]/2 (32)
= ψw,Shapleyu (I \ {v})
+ w(v)Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u ∪ {u}))−
Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u))]/2. (33)
Eq.(31) is by Lemma 43 (a), and Eq.(32) is by Lemma 43
(b). For v’s weighted Shapley centrality, we have
ψw,Shapleyv (I) = Epi[σwI (Spi,v ∪ {v})− σwI (Spi,v)]
= w(v)Epi[Pr(v 6∈ II(Spi,v))], (34)
where the last equality above is also by Lemma 43 (a).
Recall that in Axiom 10 S is the set of sink nodes and
u ∈ V \ S is a non-sink node. Then we have
1 = Epi[Pr(v ∈ II(V ))]
= Epi[
∑
u′∈V
(Pr(v ∈ II(Spi,u′ ∪ {u′}))− Pr(v ∈ II(Spi,u′)))]
(35)
=
∑
u′∈V \{v}
Pr(u′ ≺pi v)Epi[Pr(v ∈ II(Spi,u′ ∪ {u′}))−
Pr(v ∈ II(Spi,u′)) | u′ ≺pi v]+
Epi[Pr(v ∈ II(Spi,v ∪ {v}))− Pr(v ∈ II(Spi,v))] (36)
=
∑
u′∈V \{v}
Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u′ ∪ {u′}))−
Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u′))]/2 + Epi[Pr(v 6∈ II(Spi,v))]
=
∑
u′∈V \S
Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u′ ∪ {u′}))−
Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u′))]/2 + Epi[Pr(v 6∈ II(Spi,v))] (37)
= |V \ S| · Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u ∪ {u}))−
Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u))]/2 + Epi[Pr(v 6∈ II(Spi,v))] (38)
Eq. (35) is a telescoping series where all middle terms are
canceled out. Eq. (36) is because when v ≺pi u′, v ∈ Spi,u′
and thus Pr(v ∈ II(Spi,u′∪{u′})) = Pr(v ∈ II(Spi,u′))) = 1.
Eq. (37) is by Lemma 2 (b), and Eq. (38) is by Lemma 44
(b). Therefore, from Eq. (38), we have
Epi′ [Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u ∪ {u}))− Pr(v ∈ II(Spi′,u))]/2
=
1
|V \ S| (1− Epi[Pr(v 6∈ II(Spi,v))]).
Plugging the above equality into Eq. (33), we obtain
ψw,Shapleyu (I)
= ψw,Shapleyu (I \ {v}) + w(v)(1− Epi[Pr(v 6∈ II(Spi,v))])|V \ S|
= ψw,Shapleyu (I \ {v}) + 1|V \ S| (w(v)− ψ
w,Shapley
v (I)),
where the last equality above uses Eq. (34). The above
equality is exactly the one in Axiom 10.
For the uniqueness of the parametrized axiom set Aw, the
proof follows the same structure as the proof for A. The
only change is in the proof of Lemma 9, which we provide
the new version for the weighted case below.
Lemma 46 (Weighted Critical Set Instances).
Fix a V . For any normalized and non-negative node weight
function w : V → R+ ∪ {0}, let ψw be a weighted centrality
measure that satisfies axiom set Aw. For any R,U ⊆ V
with R 6= ∅ and R ⊆ U , and the critical set instance IR,U
as defined in Definition 2, its weighted centrality ψw(IR,U )
must be unique.
Proof. Consider the critical set instance IR,U . We first
consider a node v ∈ V \U . By Lemma 7, every node u ∈ V \
R is a sink node. Then we can apply the Sink Node Axiom
(Axiom 3) to iteratively remove all nodes in U \ R without
changing v’s centrality measure. After removing nodes in
U \ R, we know that in the remaining projected instance,
every node becomes an isolated node. Then we can further
remove all other nodes and only leave v in the graph, still not
changing v’s centrality measure. When v is the only node
left in the graph, we then apply the Weighted Normalization
Axiom (Axiom 8) and obtain that ψwv (IR,U ) = w(v). Thus,
every node v ∈ V \ U has uniquely determined centrality
measure w(v).
Next, we consider a node v ∈ U \ R. By Lemma 7, every
node v ∈ V \ R is a sink node. Then we can apply the
Sink Node Axiom (Axiom 3) to iteratively remove all these
sink nodes except v, such that the centrality measure of
v does not change after the removal. By Lemma 8, the
remaining instance with node set R∪{v} is still a critical set
instance with critical set R and target set R∪{v}. Thus we
can apply the Weighted Bargaining with Critical Set Axiom
(Axiom 9) to this remaining influence instance, and know
ψwv (IR,U ) = |R|w(v)/(|R|+ 1), for every node v ∈ U \R.
Finally, we consider a node v ∈ R. Again we can remove
all sink nodes in V \R iteratively by influence projection until
we only have nodes in R left, which is the instance IR,R in
the graph with node set R. It is straightforward to verify
that every pair of nodes in R are symmetric. Therefore, we
can apply the Weighted Node Symmetry Axiom (Axiom 10)
to node v ∈ R. In particular, for every isolated node u ∈
V \ U , since we have ψwu (IR,U ) = w(u), there is no leftover
share from u that v could claim. For every node u′ ∈ U \
R, we have ψwu′(IR,U ) = |R|w(u′)/(|R| + 1), and thus the
leftover share from u′ is w(u′)/(|R| + 1). By Axiom 10,
node v ∈ R would obtain w(u′)/(|R|(|R| + 1)) from u′. In
the final projected instance IR,R with node set R, it is easy
to check that every node is an isolated node. Thus by a
similar argument of removing all other nodes and applying
Weighted Normalization Axiom, we know that in this final
projected instance v’s weighted centrality is w(v). Summing
them up by Axiom 10, we have ψwv (IR,U ) = w(v)+ w(U\R)|R|(|R|+1) .
Therefore, the weighted centrality measure for instance
ψw(IR,U ) is uniquely determined.
Once we set up the uniqueness for the critical set instances
in the above lemma, the rest proof follows the proof for the
unweighted axiom set A. In particular, the linear indepen-
dence lemma (Lemma 10) remains the same, since it only
concerns about influence instances and is not related to node
weights. Lemma 12 also follows, excepted that when arguing
the centrality uniqueness for the null influence instance IN ,
we again use repeated projection and apply the Weighted
Normalization Axiom (Axiom 8) to show that each node v
in the null instance has the unique centrality measure of
w(v). Therefore, Theorem 8 holds.
E. MARTINGALE TAIL BOUNDS
There are numerous variants of Chernoff bounds and
the more general martingale tail bounds in the literature
(e.g. [20, 13, 33]). However, they either cover the case of
independent variables, or Bernoulli variables, or a bit looser
bounds, or some general cases with different conditions. In
this section, for completeness, we state the general martin-
gale tail bounds that we need for this paper, and provide a
complete proof. The proof structure follows that of [20] for
Chernoff bounds, but the result is more general.
Theorem 9 (Martingale Tail Bounds). Let
X1,X2, . . . ,Xt be random variables with range [0, 1].
(1) Suppose that E[Xi | X1,X2, . . . ,Xi−1] ≤ µi for every
i ∈ [t]. Let Y = ∑ti=1Xi, and µ = ∑ti=1 µi. For any
δ > 0, we have:
Pr{Y − µ ≥ δ · µ} ≤ exp
(
− δ
2
2 + 2
3
δ
µ
)
.
(2) Suppose that E[Xi | X1,X2, . . . ,Xi−1] ≥ µi, µi ≥ 0,
for every i ∈ [t]. Let Y = ∑ti=1Xi, and µ = ∑ti=1 µi.
For any 0 < δ < 1, we have:
Pr{Y − µ ≤ −δ · µ} ≤ exp
(
−δ
2
2
µ
)
.
Lemma 47. Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xt be Bernoulli random
variables with range {0, 1}.
(1) Suppose that E[Xi | X1,X2, . . . ,Xi−1] ≤ µi for every
i ∈ [t]. Let Y = ∑ti=1Xi, and µ = ∑ti=1 µi. For any
δ > 0, we have:
Pr{Y − µ ≥ δ · µ} ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)(1+δ)
)µ
. (39)
(2) Suppose that E[Xi | X1,X2, . . . ,Xi−1] ≥ µi, µi ≥ 0,
for every i ∈ [t]. Let Y = ∑ti=1Xi, and µ = ∑ti=1 µi.
For any 0 < δ < 1, we have:
Pr{Y − µ ≤ −δ · µ} ≤
(
e−δ
(1− δ)(1−δ)
)µ
. (40)
Proof. Let Y i =
∑i
j=1Xj , for i ∈ [t]. For (1), applying
Markov’s inequality, for any α > 0, we have
Pr{Y − µ ≥ δ · µ}
= Pr{eαY ≥ eα(1+δ)µ}
≤ E[e
αY ]
eα(1+δ)µ
(41)
=
E[eα(Xt+Y t−1)]
eα(1+δ)µ
=
E[E[eα(Xt+Y t−1) |X1, . . . ,Xt−1]]
eα(1+δ)µ
=
E[eαY t−1E[eαXt |X1, . . . ,Xt−1]]
eα(1+δ)µ
, (42)
where Inequality (41) is by the Markov’s inequality. Next,
for the term E[eαXt |X1, . . . ,Xt−1], we utilize the fact that
Xt is a Bernoulli random variable and have
E[eαXt |X1, . . . ,Xt−1]
= Pr{Xt = 0 |X1, . . . ,Xt−1}E[1 |X1, . . . ,Xt−1]
+ Pr{Xt = 1 |X1, . . . ,Xt−1}E[eα |X1, . . . ,Xt−1]
= (eα − 1)E[Xt |X1, . . . ,Xt−1] + 1
≤ (eα − 1)µt + 1
≤ e(eα−1)µt ,
where the last inequality uses the fact that 1 + z ≤ ez for
any z. Plugging the above inequality into Eq.(42), we have
Pr{Y − µ ≥ δ · µ}
≤ e
(eα−1)µtE[eαY t−1 ]
eα(1+δ)µ
≤ e
(eα−1)(µt−1+µt)E[eαY t−2 ]
eα(1+δ)µ
≤ · · · ≤ e
(eα−1)µ
eα(1+δ)µ
.
Finally, by setting α = ln(δ + 1), we obtain Inequality (39).
For (2), the analysis follows the same strategy: for any
α > 0, we have
Pr{Y − µ ≤ −δ · µ}
= Pr{e−αY ≥ e−α(1−δ)µ}
≤ E[e
−αY ]
e−α(1−δ)µ
=
E[e−αY t−1E[e−αXt |X1, . . . ,Xt−1]]
e−α(1−δ)µ
≤ e
(e−α−1)µtE[eαY t−1 ]
e−α(1−δ)µ
≤ e
(e−α−1)µ
e−α(1−δ)µ
.
Finally, by setting α = − ln(1 − δ), we obtain Inequal-
ity (40).
Recall that a function f is convex if for any x1 and x2 and
for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
f(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≤ λf(x1) + (1− λ)f(x2).
Lemma 48. Let X be a random variable with range [0, 1],
and let p = E[X]. Let Z be the Bernoulli random variable
with Pr(Z = 1) = p. For any convex function f , we have
E[f(X)] ≤ E[f(Z)].
Proof. Let X be a random variable defined on the prob-
ability space (Ω,Σ, P ), then we have
p = E[X] =
∫
Ω
X(ω)P (dω),
and
E[f(X)] =
∫
Ω
f(X(ω))P (dω).
Applying the convexity of f , together with the assumption
that the range of X is [0, 1], we have
E[f(X)] =
∫
Ω
f(X(ω))P (dω)
≤
∫
Ω
((1−X(ω))f(0) +X(ω)f(1))P (dω)
=
(
1−
∫
Ω
X(ω)P (dω)
)
f(0)
+
(∫
Ω
X(ω)P (dω)
)
· f(1)
= (1− p)f(0) + pf(1) = E[f(Z)].
Lemma 49. Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xt be random variables
with range [0, 1]. Items (1) and (2) in Lemma 47 still hold.
Proof. For item (1), following the proof of Lemma 47,
we can still obtain Inequality (42). For the term E[eαXt |
X1, . . . ,Xt−1], notice that function f(x) = eαx is con-
vex for any α > 0. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 48.
In particular, let Zt be a Bernoulli random variable with
E[Zt] = E[Xt |X1, . . . ,Xt−1]. By Lemma 48, we have
E[eαXt |X1, . . . ,Xt−1]
≤ E[eαZt ]
= Pr{Zt = 0} · 1 + Pr{Zt = 1} · eα
= (eα − 1)E[Zt] + 1
≤ (eα − 1)µt + 1
≤ e(eα−1)µt .
The rest of the proof of item (1) is the same.
For item (2), the treatment is the same, as long as we
notice that function g(x) = e−αx is also convex for any α >
0.
Lemma 50. For δ > 0, we have
eδ
(1 + δ)(1+δ)
≤ exp
(
− δ
2
2 + 2
3
δ
)
. (43)
For 0 < δ < 1, we have
e−δ
(1− δ)(1−δ) ≤ exp
(
−δ
2
2
)
. (44)
Proof. For Inequality (43), we take logarithm of both
sides, and obtain the following equivalent inequality:
f(δ) = δ − (1 + δ) ln(1 + δ) + δ
2
2 + 2
3
δ
≤ 0.
Taking the derivatives of f(δ), we have:
f ′(δ) = 1− 1 + δ
1 + δ
− ln(1 + δ) + 2δ
2 + 2
3
δ
−
2
3
δ2
(2 + 2
3
δ)2
= − ln(1 + δ) + 18δ + 3δ
2
2 · (3 + δ)2
= − ln(1 + δ) + 3 · ((3 + δ)
2 − 9)
2 · (3 + δ)2
= − ln(1 + δ) + 3
2
− 27
2 · (3 + δ)2 ;
f ′′(δ) = − 1
1 + δ
+
27
(3 + δ)3
;
f ′′′(δ) =
1
(1 + δ)2
− 81
(3 + δ)4
.
When δ ≥ 0, f ′′′(δ) = 0 has exactly two solutions at δ1 = 0
and δ2 = 3. When δ ∈ (0, 3), f ′′′(δ) < 0, and when δ > 3,
f ′′′(δ) > 0.
Looking at f ′′(δ), we have f ′′(0) = 0 and
limδ→+∞ f ′′(δ) = 0. When δ increases from 0 to 3,
since f ′′′(δ) < 0, f ′′(δ) decreases, which means f ′′(δ) < 0;
when δ increases from 3, since f ′′′(δ) > 0, f ′′(δ) keeps
increasing, but never increases above 0. Thus, for all δ ≥ 0,
f ′′(δ) ≤ 0.
Looking at f ′(δ), we have f ′(0) = 0. Since f ′′(δ) ≤ 0 for
all δ ≥ 0, f ′(δ) is monotonically non-increasing, and thus
f ′(δ) ≤ 0 for all δ ≥ 0.
Finally, looking at f(δ), we have f(0) = 0. Since f ′(δ) ≤ 0
for all δ ≥ 0, f(δ) is monotonically non-increasing, and thus
f(δ) ≤ 0 for all δ ≥ 0.
For Inequality (44), we take logarithm of both sides, and
obtain the following equivalent inequality:
g(δ) = −δ − (1− δ) ln(1− δ) + δ
2
2
≤ 0.
Taking the derivatives of g(δ), we have:
g′(δ) = −1 + ln(1− δ) + 1− δ
1− δ + δ
= ln(1− δ) + δ;
g′′(δ) = − 1
1− δ + 1.
Looking at g′′(δ), it is clear that g′′(δ) < 0 for δ ∈ (0, 1),
and g′′(0) = 0. This implies that g′(δ) is monotonically
decreasing in (0, 1). Since g′(0) = 0, we have g′(δ) ≤ 0 for
δ ∈ (0, 1). This implies that g(δ) is monotonically increasing
in (0, 1). Finally, since g(0) = 0, we have g(δ) ≤ 0 for all
δ ∈ (0, 1).
